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CHAiffi1AN JACK R. FENTON: The subject of
the statute of l1mitations in civil conspiracies.

's hearing is

Statutes of limitations are the
within which
lawsuits may be filed.
are intended to protect persons from
having to defend against suits based on events that are so old that
important evidence and witnesses may no longer be available.
In Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., the California
held that when two or more persons carry out an unlawful
harm another person, the statute of limitations does not
until the last overt act in furtherance of the agreement
has been completed.

Supreme Court
scheme to
begin to run
or conspiracy

Today, the Committee will receive testimony on whether the
Legislature should make any changes in this "last overt act" rule.
TAle will examine whether that rule is necessary in order to protect
victims of conspiracies without unfairly burdening defendants in such
cases.
Our first witness is Brian Van Camp.

How are you Brian?

MR. BRIAN VAN CAMP: Just fine, Hr. Chairman, thank you.
l'1r. Chairman, I'm appearing today on behalf of Union Home Loan Mortgage
Company. And as you suggested we are here to present testimony on
what is basically the continuation of the McVittie bill, which was
heard by this body and actually passed by this Committee in the
Assembly in the last session.
It was defeated, however, on the
Senate side on what we perceive to be basical
a
objection, that is in the minds of the Senators the wrongful joinder
that act or that bill with another bill related but not right on
the same subject.
The
, in our humble view,
not whether mortgage
loan brokers
done anything wrong in the
past. The fact
, when I was Commissioner of Corporations I was disturbed by reports of some of the problems in that
try but I'm firmly convinced that through the deliberations of this Committee, the Assembly
and the Legislature, many, if not all,of those abuses, have been addressed from a legislative standpoint and are behind us, and not the
subject of today's hearing. Nor is this an attempt to reargue the Wyatt
case, which in our view, was a case of bad facts making bad law. That
case at the trial level was not taken seriously and the facts were not
put in contention,and when the jury awarded judgment for the plaintiffs
the appellate courts were pretty well stuck with the facts as they were
deduced at trial which was basically without opposition from the defendants. Rather this is an attempt to balance the
imate needs of the
plaintiffs to get to have time, first of all, to discover the wrong
done to them and then to proceed in an orderly fashion to prepare a
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case and file it against the defendants. This is an attempt to balance
that very legitimate right with the legitimate needs of the potential
defendants to have their claims adjudicated before key witnesses die
or disappear and before records are lost or destroyed. Largely, in
the past, this has been a balanc
which has been the subject of well
argued debate before the
islative committees and has generally resulted in well reasoned rules balancing these critical needs against
each other.
Recently, however, as you have said, the statute of limitations concerning tort actions has been substantially modified
by several appeLlate courts in California in a way whlch substantially broadens the
for potential plaintif
to br
suit
in the civil tort area.
case law now states that if it is
alleged and proven that two or more persons have conspired to commit a
tort, then the statute o limitations does not begin to run or is,in
fact, tolled until the commission of the so-called last overt act by
the defendants. This rule has been applied regardless of the time of
discovery of the commission of the actions constituting the original
tort. And then, read
the cases, the last overt act apparently may
include virtually
business dealings between the claimant
and the alleged de
s following the original tortious conduct including the mere
of loan repayments at any time after the
original loan had been entered
, assuming two or more persons had
conspired to make the loan improperly.
We believe the hol
in the
and similar cases presents two basic
irst is
pla
ffs who are
alleged to have been defrauded
more than one person enjoy a longer
per
of time within which to file their
, even given identical
injuries than another
intiff who was
only one person.
The second problem, we be
led last overt act
doctrine which revives,
extent, torts
which
running
of the
icable statute
first objection, the judicial cases do
s any
for holding
open the time for fil
in cases where more
tortfeasor
had part ipated to cause
ury to a person as opposed to cases where
the injury is only caused
one person. Further,
the context of
commercial transact
s lrnost any tort feasor can be said
with someone else since under the
o re, the
is liable
tortious conduct of its
spondeat
employee.
if the conduct was incurred within the scope
the
ff
lly
going to
of the
as a defendant. The new
able to
j
ially created
therefore extends the time
set down for br
the
within which the
would now start to run
in
act
not after
after the last overt act.
tat ions
f
in
the consp
ever, the courts
from the bare
their other act

of the statute of limiovert act, however, is justiarose. There
In the c
1 law cases, howthat no civil liability arises
to act unlawful , independent of
a c
iracy al
ion is

to
joinder as defendants of all parties to the tort regardl~ss
of whether they actually participated in the commission of that tort.
The statute of limitations in cases invol
civil conspiracies is
that period specified for actions based upon the underlying wrongful
o nduct which was the actual subject of the conspiracy.
Again
the commercial banking and lending areas, the
Supreme Court's new doctrine is carried to an unreasonable extent.
The last overt act constituting the fraudulent loan transaction there
was a mere acceptance of loan payments made over the course of the
time of the repayment of the loan. The reasonable application of this
rule could well extend the time within which to bring their actions.
CHAiffi1AN FENTON: Let me interrupt you one minute, Brian,
so I can introduce Assemblymen Art Torres from Los Angeles, Dave
Stirling from Whittier and Willie Brown from San Francisco.
MR. VAN CAMP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We believe that the
natural extension of the Wyatt holding would keep alive actions for upwards of decades. Assume that a 30 year loan had been made under improper circumstances at the outset. Under such circumstances and the
new rule, the time for bringing that action would be three years past
the final payment of that loan, possibly 33 years after the loan had
been made. The natural consequences of that would be a difficulty in
trying the case as well as an enlargement of the damages, usually the
longer the time runs since the occurrence of the problem, the higher
the damages.
It allows the potential plaintiff to sit in the weeds
and wait for further overt acts, largely controlled by himself in making the repayments and expand the damages and largely diminish the
capability of the defendants to adequately try the case.
Viewed in the context of even non-commercial transactions,
however, the last overt act doctrine creates similarly anomalous results. In the libel and slander area, for instance, if the plaintiff
can find at least one publication or statement of a defamatory nature
within the statutory period he can use that statement to revive and
make actionable any previous libelous or slanderous remarks made by
the same persons regardless of time at which such previous statements
were made, and regardless of the fact that the plaintiff had known all
along of such earlier statements. Since the courts have held that the
knowledge or discovery of alleged tortious conduct has no bearing on
the tolling of the statute of limitations as long as the last overt
act has not been completed, this doctrine bears no relationship to
other cases where the law tolls the running of statutes of limitations
for what we believe are good causes. Thus, if after the commission
of the tort a defendant conceals the fact of the wrongdoing from the
plaintiff, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
plaintiff actually discovers or should reasonably have discovered the
fact of the wrongdoing.
Similarly, if the plaintiff is in a relationship with the
defendant, where the defendant is pledged to guard the best interests
of the plaintiff, then the statute of limitations, again, reasonably
does not begin to run during the continuation of that relationship.
Thus, persons who are under the care of a physician, an attorney, a
guardian, a trustee or other similar fiduciaries do not have the
statute of limitations running against them for as long as such persons
-3-

continue in that relationship of protection or care from the defendant
absent the actual or constructive discovery of the wrongful act.
In ordinary business transactions, however, absent a special
showing, all parties are presumed to be on an equal footing and do not
need the additional assistance which the last overt act doctrine confers upon them. Again, in the lending arena,once the loan is made
and the facts constituting its illegality are discovered, then presumably the borrower is in no worse position than any other plaintiff
who has discovered the commission of the wrongful acts against him,
and the new law should encourage him to reduce his claim to an action
brought against the defendants within a reasonable time. This we believe the Legislature in the past has encouraged, but the courts have
discouraged with their recent pronouncements.
For the above reasons, the Legislature,in our view, should
act with all deliberate speed to preserve the integrity of its previously enunciated policies governing the filing of actions to
maintain the delicate balance between the rights of plaintiffs to seek
redress for wrongful actions, and the rights of defendants to bring
forth clear evidence pertaining to such allegations. More specifically, the Legislature should, in our view, amend the Code of Civil
Procedure to make it clear that once the tortious conduct has been
covered, the statute of limitations should commence to run regardless of either the number of tortfeasors who have committed the wrongful actions or the later occurrence of so-called overt acts.
If such
acts occur they will certainly also be actionable, but such acts should
not of themselves operate to extend the life of lawsuits cit
earl
conduct by the tortfeasor which would otherwise be barred by the ordinary running of the stature of limitations. The
islature should
make it clear that such broad claims do not suddently spring to life
because of the corr@ission of new wrongful acts. Further, the Legisature should address
so-called civil
racy
and conf
that
not suffic
to toll the
of the statute f
on claims which would otherwise be barred. Once the
1
claimant has d covered the alleged wrong, ,a claim
be filed on
a timely bas
regardless of the number of persons alleged to be involved in its perpetrat
Finally,
giving redress to this area
of the law, we cannot and do not urge that any revision
the
law be made retroactively. Lawsuits are currently work
their way
through the courts on the basis of the rulings handed down in
and others.
Such lawsuits, in our view, should not and
verse
affected
any legislation which this Committee would consider
in the
sess
of the
islature.
In addition, the Legislat~re should probably
that actions may still be maintained under
the
doctrine through, say, June 30, 1982.
We apprec
the considerat
of the Committee to this
urgent problem
in our view has done violence to the delicate
balance between the justif
needs of both plaintiffs and defendants, especial
the co~mercial area. The needs of business
and others in this state to be able to
an their affairs and avoid
the necess
of defend
claims
re not capable of determination on the basis of current information or with the assistance
of witnesses who can adequately recall all pertinent events, makes
this suggested amendment
for
considered de iberation.
you for your time
considerat
-4-

CHAiffi1AN FENTON:

Thank you very much.

Edwin Preston.

MR. EDWIN PRESTON:
I am Edwin Preston, a lawyer from Los
I'm 1n private practice.
I am not appear
on behalf of
a y specific client although our office would tend to represent clients
that would have the same interests in legislation as Mr. Van Camp. A
civil conspiracy,as Mr. van Camp mentioned, is not a tort as contrasted
with a criminal conspiracy. As Wyatt has correctly pointed out, it implicates all who agree to a plan to commit a wrong, and tacit consent
is enough to bring someone within the gambit of a conspiracy. Thus,
a conspiracy is nothing more than a method of creating a joing liability for defendants who did not actually directly participate in
the wrongful act or for defendants who are only slightly culpable as
compared with the culpability of the principal actor.
The rule as it
presently exists in California developed from the Schessler v. Keck
case where the court of appeal applied the criminal law conspiracy to
a civil conspiracy based on an argument made by the plaintiff's counsel
that a criminal conspiracy rule should apply and the defendant's
counsel's incorrect concession that that was the applicable rule.
So the line of cases in California developed from a mistake by defendant's counsel in failing to cite the Bowman v. Wohlke decision
which is discussed both in Chief Justice Bird's opinion in Wyatt and
by Justice Richardson's concurrence in Wyatt.
A~geles.

It's my view that Bowman properly applies the civil conspiracy rule and the statute of limitations the way it ought to be
applied.
The reason I say that, aside from questions of freshness of
evidence and the things that Mr. Van Camp principally referred to, is
that the rule doesn't make sense. To give an example of why I contend
that the rule doesn't make sense, I'm going to draw from a case that
was somewhat a companion case to the Wyatt case.
I was counsel for
certain of the defendants in the case Pardee v. United States Power
Squadrons which was decided by the court of appeal in Los Angeles.
The Supreme Court granted a hearing in that case while Wyatt was pending. After the Wyatt decision had been decided, that's pr1or to argument of my case, the Supreme Court retransferred the case to the court
of appeal for a modification of the opinion to include reference to
Wyatt. As I think I mentioned the Pardee case is not published.
I
should also mention that the Pardee case is dismissed and settled so
that the parties there no longer have any particular interest in where
the rule goes.
I should also point out I'm going to use some of the
names out of the Pardee case for convenience, it shouldn't be taken
as a suggestion by me that any of the wrongful conduct was actually
carried out. We'll treat is as a hypothetical.
The case was for the tort of interference with business advantage or for inducing breach of contract. And, according to the
plaintiff, the tort was carried out by one of the defendants, Mr.
Hutchings, in November of 1971 by causing action to terminate the
plaintiff's contract with another. The notice of the termination was
mailed to the plaintiff, and let's assume that that notice was mailed
by Mr. Quint who was also a defendant, and let's assume that Mr. Quint
aqreed with Hr. Hutchings' action, although Hr. Quint didn't take the
action, all he did was take the letter to the post office. Under the
rule of Wvatt and prior cases, Mr. Quint can be held as a conspirator
in the tort of inducinq the breach of this contract. Let's assume
that the old contract ends in February of 1972, that is about three
months after the action was taken, and that a new contract with an
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outsider, Hr.
, is made in Barch of 1972. Now you have an action
filed in March of 1973, and that's roughly the sequence of things in
this decision.
Is the action
against the defendants? If you
have a
, the
against
1 the defendants because Mr.
's a member of
, he mailed the letter and
with
, the new contract was made with Mr. Cov in March of 1973.
All these things are in furtherance of the cons racy.
I should point
out that every time
done under this new contract or it's
renewed in future years you
say that also is in furtherance of
the conspiracy so that statute never really starts running. I was told
a story, and it mav be
l, that a trial judge in a conspiracy
case where this was be
discussed made the comment to the defendant's
counsel, "As far as I'm concerned the defense o this case is in furtherance of the
, so there you've got a case where
Mr.
int can be
, even
he's only,let's say,
on
per
Mr. Hutch
is the more culpable
defendant.
let's assume that Mr.
did all those things
bv himself
Is Mr. Hutch
, now the more culpable person, go
to be held? The answer is no. He's not, because
the tort's complete, the
is done in November of 1971. Assuming
you've got a one-year statute, and I should
used '74 in my
because it's a
statute, it's too late for the
aintiff to
file an action agains
. Hutch
So
you have is, by virtue
o a
, you br
in someone who is onlv sl
culpable on
the outside, and he may be held forever, but f you don't have the con' the man
whom the real
lies, the most culpable
person
off scot free.
submit that s
doesn't make sense as
a matter of justice.
statute?

Under what
statute

t

or

indue

ASSEHBLn'lAN STIRLING:
MR. PRESTON:
all

Yes,
of

That's statutory?
a miscellaneous tort in the catchProcedure.
s
t tr
its
, or the

s
lost

th

0

it later
the

in

as
relates to the
of limitation. When
or upon the
inducement?
defined
runnina,
ference.
there's
f

the cases have
statute is going to start
virtue of the interof contract, but
fore, the
inact

The contract in this
icular instance was terminated by a notice
of November of 1971, the termination became effective during February
of 1972 and you can argue that the tort was complete in November, 1971.
I think you can also argue that the tort was
The damage was
s ffered
1972. The tort is clearly
before this
March of 1972 nmv contract with somebody else. The
ff was not
a party to the new contract at all.
In Wyatt, ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Was the plaintiff aware of that new

contract?
MR. FRESTON: Well, of course, the plaintiff was aware his
own contract was terminated. Even if there had been no ...
ASSEJ\1BLYMAN STIRLING:
actually occur?

Is that not when the damage would

MR. PRESTON: No, if there had been no new contract, there
still would have been damage because the plaintiff ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: But, is that not when he learned that
his own contract had been terminated.
Isn't that when the damage
occurred?
MR. FRESTON:

I would say that that's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

A.nd, so it would be two years from

that date?
MR. FRESTON: Yes, that was our position and that was
November of 1971. The new contract doesn't affect his damage. He
loses his -- I'm going work for you, I've lost my contract, even if
no one else does work for you.
I have had my damage.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
two years from that date?
MR. FRESTON:

Yes.

ASSEM.BLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. FRESTON:
can't answer that.

And the plaintiff waited more than

Y.ihy?

You'd have to ask the plaintiff.

I certainly

ASSEMBLY~1AN STIRLING:
Then it didn't come out during the
course of the law and motion discussions on this particular subject?

MR. FRESTON: The mental gymnastics the plaintiff went through
did not come out. But he knew in November of 1971 that he was losing
his contract. He was out of business with respect to that contract,
and his contract actually,in fact, ended during February of 1972. Now
the new contract is in furtherance of a conspiracy, but that particular activity was not a plaintiff-related activity in the sense that the
further activities in the Wyatt case were, because the plaintiff didn't
participate in those activities even though it was in furtherance of
that conspiracy which led to the loss of the plaintiff's own contract.
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Then you try to figure the justification of the conspiracy theory being created anyway.
MR. PRESTON: Well, I understand why the conspiracy is there,
and
's because someone else l
Mr. Quint helped Mr. Hutchings in
some way to do a wrongful act, and Mr. Quint's just as liable as Mr.
Hutchings, even though Mr. Quint did some incidental things.
ASSEHBLYMAN STIR.LING: But isn't it really for the purpose
of simply extending the statute? Wasn't the conspiracy theory which
extends the statute of limitation period, wasn't that basically created
by the courts so as to give this particular
aintiff a longer period
of time within which to file the suit?
MR. PRESTON: I would have to say I don t believe that s true.
As I ment
,
rule between at least the time of Bowman v. Wohlke
and the case I mentioned, Schessler v. Keck, the rule
iforn
was
that each tort -- I think you
mult
famations there.
I had
a case in the mid '60's involving multiple defamations. Each defamation is its own cause of action. And the statute runs on each one from
the time of the publication
the defamation. And the only reason
that the civil cons racy tolling situation arose
California, which
it did in Schessler v. Keck -- that's the first case I ve ever found
deal
way ~ was because the defendant who had a good
defense
Bowman v. Wohlke, conceded that he didn t have a defense
when the plaintiff,gras
for straws,cited a criminal case where a
cons racy is a substantive crime. The
inti f makes that argument,
the defense says, "Yes, that's
ht.
I
on that issue." It
really wasn't reasoned. The court was misled
that has led to a
line of cases dealing with that situat
I have never seen a
that dealt with the
that I just presented to you where
a sl
cul
r which runs the thing out
the bad guy
he' be ff scot free.
we're say
a
in
perhaps
really has
purpose of extending o
int
has to sue.
Isn
that what we
It was created
That's all
basical
does
was created for the purpose of al
period of t
within which to br
suit.

point, what
by the court,
an
ier case. That
the amount of time that
real
come out
?
for the purpose, this
ff a

was? No, I
racy
was created for
responsible for a tort even though
cowmit the tort. That's the purpose for

l\1R. PRESTON:
agree
the purpose of mak
he
't actual
a civil consp racy.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That's the result of it that's not
the purpose
purpose was to g
the
intiff a longer
pe od of t
That s what
comes out to be isn't it?
MR. PRESTON:
in exis
goes.

this

the civil conspiracies situation was
, I can't tell you how far back it

MR. FRESTON: And, it was in existence during a lengthy
period of time and applied by the California Supreme Court in the
situation ...
the
the

ASSEMBLYJ11AN STIRLING: I'm sorry.
I'm asking the purpose of
rule, not the conspiracy theory, I understand that.
I mean
was apparently created by the court for the purpose of giving
plaintiff a longer period of time to sue.

MR. FRESTON: You mean the Wyatt rule. vlell that's what
did with it. Yes, as I say, in Bowman v. Wohlke the Supreme
Court said, "Yes in conspiracies. Everybody Is res~ponsible, but it
doesn't e~tend the statute." That was the point I was making. So
the principal reason for civil conspiracy is not to extend the statute
of l~mitations, that was an afterthought.

~t~

f

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

I understand that.

ASSEMBLYMAN WILLIE L. BROWN, JR.: Let me ask a question of
you Mr. Freston. Prior to either the Wyatt case or the second case you
cited, nad the statute of limitations ever been extended by virtue of
the fact that a civil conspiracy was involved?
MR. FRESTON: Not that I am aware of in California. As I
say, there is a California Supreme Court case which said it is not
extended. And Chief Justice Bird and Justice Richardson differ on
their interpretation of that case. I suggest that Justice Richardson's
reading on that case is correct, and that the Supreme Court had said
it does not extend.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: As the law now stands in the Wyatt and
the Schessler cases, the statute of limitations is never tolled if
there 1s a c1vil conspiracy.
MR. FRESTON:
Is never tolled if there is a civil conspiracy?
I would say 1t is tolled if there is a civil conspiracy so long as
anything is done that can be pointed to as being some sort of act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and that's an extremely broad concept.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: But it only commences to be tolled from
the date of that last alleged act?
MR. FRESTON:

That's when the statute starts running, that's

correct.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Okay.

Do you have anything else?

MR. FRESTON: Yes, I'd just like to make one other comment
which I think ties into this and goes to the question of discovery and
the running of the statute. I think the courts have commenced to broaden
that, this relates to it, it is not precisely the point, but I think
that the Committee should consider the judicial enlargement of the
typical fraud statute of limitations rule that the statute starts to
run from discovery whenever that may be, and the possibility of having
two rules should exist. Mainly, where you have a special relationship
such as the fiduciary relationship, discovery makes very good sense.
Where you have no special relationship between the parties, I think the
-9-

traditional rule that the statute starts running when the cause of
action is complete perhaps may make more sense. The effect of this is
to shift the burden a 1
bit because it is very simple for a plaintiff to stand up and say, "I didn't know," which shifts a tremendous
burden to a defendant in fiduciary cases that makes good sense . . In
ordinary cases, I think that where a person has suffered damage, that
should be enough to start the statute of limitations running, requiring
him to f
out what's go
on unless you have a rule which is similar to what is generally followed in the federal courts, and which the
courts in California have occasionally applied, although usually they
don't find they need to. That is, the statute is tolled during such
period of time in those situations where the defendant in involved in
fraudulent concealment of the cause of act
Lest somebody argue
that this means a plaintiff may not real
be hurt for years and years
and the statute will have run, I suggest that in these situations the
case of action actually matures when the
f suffers damage. And
if the damage
n't real
suffered until
, the court is going to
find that the cause of action didn't accrue until that later time. And
I
call the Committee's attention to a case of some years ago
points this out, though not qu
in the statute of limitations
and is narrower than courts would find today in product liabil
what not, but that case is Hale v. DePaoli 33 Cal. 2d, in 1948, where
the defendant
a
rail
, and 19 years
later it broke, the
iff was hurt, there was no problem with the
cause of action. So I'm not sugges
that in that case the cause of
action would have been barred some 18 years ago or so.
I think you
very much for your time.
CHAIID4AN FENTON:

Thank you very much.

Douglas DeVries.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members
DeVries I'm an attorney in Sac~
Trial
Association, and in
Klein who,
is in a
Sacramento against Union
Home Loan on behalf of five families who have the threat of losing their
homes being held over them today.
In that context I take exception
to Mr. Van
's remarks that the abuses of th
industry are behind
us, and
ly ith respect to Union Horne Loans.

of the
rarnento, a
the spirit

lar po
MR. DeVRIES:

These are the
facts.
Our office is associ30 cases.
I
that there are others
which I believe some of the other witnesses

ss.
CHAI ffi."LAN FENTON :

I'm sure Mr. Emkin's people will tell us

about
facts, and
it's an
Generally, in terms of pol
tations in this context, and statutes
law should be enacted
t the
10-

underlying the statute of 1
, we believe that the
rather than the

tors of fraud. And this
especial
be true in the context
fiduc
relationsh
by definition involve people with superior knowl
and
ise
are, in effect, advis
the people
that come to them about how to manage their affairs. And when they
that situation to bilk those
have a situwhere the law
t favor the victim. Another
that comes
into
here, I believe,
the policy that disputes between c
zens
should be
on their merits, and it is in that context that it
generally held that the statute of limitations is a disfavored defense.
It's a
bar to keep people from courts and allow them
to resolve their dis
on their merits. So, what you have is a limited purpose for a statute of limitations that has as its primary
purpose, as the Wyatt court said, the protection of defendants only in
the context of allowing them not to be burdened with defending against
stale claims.

•

Now, in the context of the Wyatt case and ones before this
Committee, there are three basic areas that I bel
we can address
in stale claims. One is the availability of evidence. Well, in the
situation you have before you, you have a scheme that is an ongoing
manipulation of loans and loan interest where the loans are continual
being collected on, up to and often including the time the complaint
is filed. The evidence is clearly all there, because the account in
effect is still open at the time of discovery.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
referring to?

What's the time of discovery that you're

MR. DeVRIES: Well, the situation for instance on a three
year loan, such as the Wyatt facts -- when the loan comes around to
the three years, and the balloon payment that was hidden from the person becomes evident, and they realize that they owe as much or more
than they actually borrowed, they have knowledge of facts they didn't
have when the loan was taken out. Now the question is, and I think
this gets to another point, are the people sleeping on their rights,
when they don't file a suit right then? Well as the Wyatt court pointed
out in recognizing the situation, they're in a
from which there is
very little escape. The
you're talk
about are
that
probably wouldn't have qualified for the loans in terms of the full
payment of the loans. All they were paying was interest and a very
small part of the principal. In that case, I believe it was $18 a
month. Now, when they discovered that, the option that's given to
them
not to renew the loan, rather, it's to negotiate a new loan
for which a
fee
collected. Now the
alternative to that
to go out and look for other money.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: t.Yell isn't there also an alternative of
filing the lawsu1t when they discover it?
MR. DeVRIES:
loan, you

Well you have a problem.
threat of foreclosure.

CHAIRMAN l·'ENTON:
based on fraud?
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

You still have the

Can't you stay that with your lawsuit
Yes, that's automatic.
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MR. DeVRIES: Yes, that's right. Those are stayed, but we're
getting off the point. That's when they get to a lawyer. What these
people are doing -- The question in the statute of limitations situation as to whether a plaintiff is sleep
on his rights, is not whether
there are procedural remedies available to them. What we're talking
about is, as Mr. Van Camp said, balancing the equities between the parties.
Well, what those parties were doing, in these cases, was trying to meet
their financial obligations to a party who they thought they didn't
understand. Not somebody that had defrauded them. They went to look
for other money, and when they made applications for other money, to see
if they could get a
to pay off that loan, credit inquiries then
went to the sister corporations of Union Home Loan, Western Computer
Services, for instance, who told the people as
for credit information, "No, these people own us money. They're a bad credit risk." So
they couldn't get the money. So then they go back, so then they renew
the loan.
In other words,
kept their relationship.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Let me ask a question.
If an inquiry is
made to a credit report1ng agency and there
a debt outstanding,
how does the credit agency avoid revealing that information if they
are literally bound to properly represent what the true facts are from
their knowledge?
true.

MR. DeVRIES: That's exactly right.
report it, it's
The people were in default. They
' t pay their ...
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

But they have to report that, do they

not?
MR. DeVRIES:

Yes.
not

it, and

another loan?
MR. DeVRIES:
It
not a
ir
report
it.
,
renewed the loan? In other words, if you
understand the facts of the Wyatt situation, a payment that was late
was considered to
them in a position where their loan would not
be renewed. So the
way you could pay off the first loan, was to
loan a new loan.
It wasn t cant
the exis
obwas creat
a
loan for which there was a
when you
to the end of the first loan, the
Home Loan was not cont
the same relationship. They wanted
to create a new relationsh
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
you
want to
MR. DeVRIES:
were
were
faith.

Well, if the same thing occurred at the
had occurred at the end of the first, then
statute until the people decided they
Is that what you're saying?

No. What
960's,

to fulfi 1
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

is that the people that
Union Home Loan,
their loans in

I understand that.

MR. DeVRIES: All right. What put them in the courts was
their realizat1on that the real damage they were going to suffer was
at the end, always at the end.
It was when all the late charges that
didn't know about kept accruing.
It was when they discovered
t'1at what they were doing was -- every time there was a late charge
were
interest.
CHAI~AN

FENTON:

That was on the first loan?

MR. DeVRIES: Right. And then their homes were going to be
taken away from them. That's when they went to lawyers.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
the second one?
MR. DeVRIES:

The first loan didn't exist anymore.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
MR. DeVRIES:

On the first loan, before they negotiated

They had negotiated the second one?

Right.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: All right. My question to you, if for instance they hadn't gone to a lawyer at the second loan, and let's say
at the end of the second one the same thing again, do you feel that
the statute should continually be tolled?
MR. DeVRIES:

No.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
MR. DeVRIES:

You understand what I'm asking you?

I do.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I'm not quarreling with you.
trying to get your reasons.

I'm just

MR. DeVRIES: What I'm suggesting is, in the context of what
a conspiracy 1s, whether it's tort or not a tort, or whether the Wyatt
case has ih fact, changed the statute of limiations or not, I think
answers your question. The nature of the wrong alleged in the Wyatt
case, and upon which the jury gave its verdict, was that the defendant
had designed a scheme that went beyond a three year loan relationship.
It had as its purpose the maintenance of an on going relationship
with a victim, from whom money could be obtained, on an on going basis.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
MR. DeVRIES:

I know that.

That's the nature and scope of (inaudible).

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I know that. But if they did this the
second time, and they hid it again, with your theory, you would continually toll the statute, right?
MR. DeVRIES:

Well, it's not my theory.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
MR. DeVRIES:

It's the idea ...

Well, it is what you're telling us now.

It's the idea that as long as the defendant
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is perpetrating the tort, it's an ongoing tort, that tort has not
concluded.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Regardless of the fact that the plaintiff
has discovered it, knows about it, knows about the extra charges and
so forth, and for whatever reason gets another loan, then as long as
this relationship exists, and they are committing a tort, then the
statute should be tolled until the plaintiff brings an action?
MR. DeVRIES:

Until the defendant terminates the wrong doing.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
where
tion, a scheme ...

Either way.

Because we're not talk
rstand
We are talk

CHAIRMAN FENTON:
as

Okay.
about a situation
about a combina-

I understand that.

DeVRIES:
... that was designed to take advantage of these
as you could keep them ignorant of their rights.
But when the baloon payment becomes due,
been victimized.

d

MR. DeVRIES:
to be

Well, they discover that their homes are going
them.

more and
MR. DeVRIES:

Yes.

knew that.

CHAIRMAN
of 1
MR. DeVRIES:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
matter,
should it run?

Then tell us in the context of
d commence to run, and to what

MR. DeVRIES:

We agree with the holding in Wyatt and the
t
in other areas before the Wyatt case,
Schessler, and about four or five others cited by the courts
loan frauds. The courts held that if the nature
of
is such than is be
perpetrated by a combination of two
or more
,
an
bas , such that the defendants are bene£
from the
wrong do
, at the very least the statutes should
not commence to run unti such time as the wrongful conduct has terminated. The statute f
was not
the Wyatt deThe
ion is when the
is
As long as
you have people in
ion still perpetrating the fraud, the tort
has not concluded.
cases
such
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CHAIRMJ\N FJ::N'I'ON:
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
answer to my quest1on.

Are there other
Wait a minute.

I m wait

for the

MR. DeVRIES: So the answer
when the tort concludes,
assuming that the person has knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, the statute commences to run.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: And
is your
then that from the
first contract, that there is no cessation. If they're ten additional
separate contracts, it relates back to a continuation of the first
contract. That's your theory.
MR. DeVRIES:
That was

I

That's the scheme.
You see ...

That's not my theory.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Wait a minute wait a minute.
your theory. That would have to be your theory.
MR. DeVRIES:

That is

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: That would have to be your
, otherwise, your theory would have to obviously be that if from day one,
through day fifteen with contract fifteen, the circumstances are similar.
The funding source is similar, the procedures are similar. The balloon
payment is similar, then you, under your theory, argue that all fifteen
contracts shall be the subject of a lawsuit, rather than just the contract discovered within the two year period.
MR. DeVRIES: Yes, I agree with you, that is my theory, but
with one point of clarification. The plaintiff must still prove that
one of the purposes for getting the person into the first loan was
to get them hooked on, as the court referred to it, a treadmill, that
would allow you to keep bringing them back in for the similar loans.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: So, under your
, you would concede if on
ts there is a transfer of business relationships from X to Y, and Y had no way of
knowl
of
X did period, the records would not reflect it,et cetera, then the
first eight, when the lawsuit is commenced, could only
t X
and not against Y.
MR. DeVRIES:

Correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
MR. DeVRIES:

Is that a concession that you make?

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
Wyatt case?

Is that a concession that's made

MR. DeVRIES:
I believe so. That in fact was not in the
Wyatt case because 1t happened that all the defendants were in the
conspiracy. But, with one exception in the facts, I think
was
Mrs. Flink ...
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the

ASSEHBLYMAN BROWN: Well, I don't know the case.
know what you're talk1ng about.

I don't

MR. DeVRIES: With the exception of one defendant. Yes, if
the person then 1s outside of the conspiracy, and that conspiracy is
no longer perpetrating the underlying tort of fraud on the person,
and they have knowledge of facts, they have an obligation to file a
lawsuit within three years.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: So, your theory finally is, I take it
Mr. DeVries, that as a minimum, the statute of limitations should
not commence to run until there is total cessation of conduct by the
al
conspirators?
MR. DeVRIES:

Directed against that plaintiff.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: That plaintiff and then you add, on top
of that, the fact that the plaintiff must have acquired knowledge, or
had a reasonable opportunity to acquire knowledge at or about the time
of the cessation.
MR. DeVRIES:

Or before.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
is only a single tortfeasor?

Is the same theory applicable where it

MR. DeVRIES: That issue, as has been pointed out in
the Committee staff's analysis of this bill, was specifically reserved
the
court.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

My question to you

is should your theory

?

MR. DeVRIES:

Should the same theory apply if an individual
scheme?

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
MR. DeVRIES:

Yes, one corporation.

One corporation, as a single entity?

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

Yes.

own view,
tak
ment

CHAIRMAN FENTON: You answered me that as long as they keep
,
instance, until they take their last payor commit the last act, the statute doesn't run.
MR. DeVRIES:
CHAIRM&~

foreclos

Yes, if . .

FENTON:

Maybe they send them a notice that of
ike that.

MR. DeVRIES: Yes, if that is a legitimate concern, that
there is a distinction between the two, then the person who is ingenius enough to carry this off
himself, which is unlike , but,
-16-

assuming they did, their rights should be determined with the ongoing
fraud as opposed to somebody -- in other words, if the distinction is
not between multiple tortfeasors and single tortfeasors, but rather
between single acts of fraud, and ongoing schemes of fraud, it's the
ongoing shcemes t.hat should.b~ treated together. Whether they are
carried off by an enterprising individual, or by a combination of
people.
Now, getting on to the other part of stale claims that was
brought up, the notion of unavailability of witnesses.
In this situation, just on the real facts of the Wtatt case, the problem the defendants have in this case is the avai ability of witnesses and former
employees, not the unavailability. You are being asked to consider a
change in law. As it stands right now the statute is the way it is.
No one,certainly not Union Home Loan, has shown any prejudice by virtue
of the unabailability of witnesses.
In fact, the idea that they didn't
defend themselves in the lawsuit is a misstatement. The principals
Union Home Loan chose not to appear at trial. Their depositions, however, had been taken and were read to the jury, and the jury had an
appreciation of the relationship of the principals to the scheme.

of

Now, the matter of whether a criminal conspiracy is itself
a crime, and whether a similar conspiracy is itself a tort, I will
leave to other gentlemen who I think are probably better versed than
I.
I would close with just one general comment. And that is that
this professed need for a change in the law from the Legislature is
not being asked by the commercial banking industry. Nor in fact, is
it beamg asked for by the mortgage brokerage industry as a whole.
It
is being asked for by the Union Home Loan Company, which is one company,
one private company. And as to that company, I would remind each of
you that the Supreme Court of California characterized them in these
terms.
"There was substantial evi(lence that appellants were involved
in perfecting a scheme whoe purpose was to trap respondents on a
financial treadmill from which they could not escape. There has been
no counter-balancing evidence presented as to prejudice to that entity."
Thank you for your time.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
MR. DeVRIES:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
MR. DeVRIES:

May I ask one question?

Are they now showing up as witnesses?

Well, we will probably know it about a week

or so.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Oh, I see. There have been no subsequent
trials where persons have been subpoenaed and exercised the inability
of the subpoena to reach in the certain jurisdiction.
MR. DeVRIES: Well, that may change too because I believe
the subpoena range ~s changing to 500 miles, but I don't believe it's
going to happen until after January 1st.
In the meantime the five
consolidated cases in trial in Sacramento right now are still in the
plaintiff's phase. They're in about their fourth week.
I suppose
that the defendants can make their decision whether to come forward
and tell their side in about a week or two.
-17-

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
in these cases?
MR. DeVRIES:

Am I to understand you are a co-counsel

No, I'm the partner of one of the co-counsels.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: Okay. Then I won't ask you the rest of
the questions. Thank you very much.
Mr. Allan Emkirn;
MR. ALLAN EMKIN: Mr. Chairman, members, my name is Allan
Ernkin.
I am here representing the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles.
I have with me two staff attorneys from our South Central office, which
is at the corner of Manchester and Broadway, in the middle of South
Central Los Angeles. And they will express to you their feelings of
about any proposed legislation dealing with the Wyatt holding. First,
Paul Tremblay.
MR. PAUL TREMBLAY: Thank you.
I want to start by giving
an example of a case that I'm handling right now. It's in litigation
in the courts in Los Angeles.
It's a fairly recently filed case. Some
of the facts I'm not sure of myself. But what we do know, the horneowners are Earry and Uretha Jones. They've owned their horne since the
late fifties. The home is free and clear right now, except for an obligation to Union Horne Loans. The Jones' went to Union Horne Loan in
1973, and they contracted for a loan in the amount of $1,400.
Somehow between 1973 and 1980, they made most of the payments in this
loan. We're not real sure exactly what happened during that period
of time, but it's their claim at least, that they made most of the payments. They did miss some, and we wouldn't claim otherwise. In early
1980, or perhaps late 1979, Union Horne Loan foreclosed, claiming that
the Jones' still owed close to $1,000 dollars on this $1,400 dollars,
which they had been paying on for seven years. We filed the lawsuit,
and we've stayed the foreclosure, although it's certainly not an automatic procedure, as it was said earlier. There are cases where,sornetirnes, the request for the stay of foreclosure is denied. In this
case, though, we were able to stay a foreclosure. Actually, in this
case, the request for the stay of foreclosure was denied, but we were
able to get the unlawful detainer transferred to superior court, so
that's the way we're keeping them in possession, in the meantime, while
this case is being litigated. The fraud involved in the dase of the
Jones' was that they were not aware that this $1,400 dollar loan included a trust deed on their property. And in their case ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Wasn't the court concerned with potential
fraud when it refused to stay the foreclosure?
MR. TREMBLAY: No, the problem in this case is that an
alleged bonafied purchaser named Hubert Goldberg, who has purchased
other Union Horne Loan contracts before, or purchased homes at Union
Horne Loan sales, purchased the property, and he went in and said,
"I'm an innocent purchaser." The court tended to think that he was.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
has ever denied a stay.

And that's about the only time the court

MR. TREMBLAY: But that happens a lot. And in those cases
the homeowners will be out of possession and all their equity will be
gone.
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ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

Those are a different set of facts.

MR. TREMBLAY: Certainly. I really wanted to point out that
's not automat1c. You can go in and ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: No, it isn't. But there has to be a different set of facts.
If it's the original trust deed, and the original
trustor, and the original trustee, and the original beneficiary, it's
almost automatic.
MR. TREMBLAY:

I would concede that.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

-Is that correct?

MR. TREMBLAY: Yes, although without the Wyatt rule it certainly wouldn't be. Because,in this case, the Jones' d1dn't know
about the fact of a trustee until the house was in foreclosure. And
they didn't come to a lawyer until -- well they didn't get notice of
the sales, so they didn't come to me until after the sale. Now let's
assume that .•.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
MR. TREMBLAY:

They didn't get notice of the sale?

No, they didn't get notice of the sale either.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

Is that an established fact or an alleged

fact?
MR. TREMBLAY:
It's an alleged fact.
In this case,they didn't
know, they didn't discover the fraud until very late, so Wyatt would
not be directly applicable. We could assume that tnere--are s1milar
situations where they would discover the fact that there's a trust deed
soon after the incidence of the loan. But that's not the time that
they go to lawyers. I mean they don't go to lawyers until the property
is actually in foreclosure. And if that had happened in this case it
would have been seven years later. Without Wyatt, the statute of limitations would have tolled, and even though these folks stand to lose
their home, without a rule like the Wyatt rule, their house would be
gone. There's no statute of limitations applicable to trustee. sales.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
fide purchaser, right?
MR. TREMBLAY:

But in your case you have a presumed bona-

We disagree that he's a bonafide purchaser.

CHAIRMAN FENTON: But if you do, then Wyatt wouldn't apply
in any event, if the court buys it.
MR. TREMBLAY: Well, no, it damages against Union Home Loan,
you could go after Union Home Loan.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Yes, that was what I was bringing up.

MR. TREMBLAY: Well, without Wyatt they couldn't even go
after Union Home Loans for damages relat1ng to the original fraud.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

No, I understand that.
-19-

not?
the statute
If, in fact
fraud, not
was a reasonable
, would the statute com~

that.

m

s

You can't

any better

not
s

I

ASSEMBLYMAN BRO'W"N: All
So you then would suppor~.the theory that ~rom the aay you are evicted, that statute, whatever
it be, should commence to run?
MR. TREMBLAY:
That would take care of the problem with foreclosure that I was aadress
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
That was not actually eviction he's referring to-nut rather notice of foreclosure, or something like that.
MR. TREMBLAY:

Something like that.

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
Yes.
Some objective measurement that
persons who are in the commercial field could rely upon. So they would
know that point beyond which their books can be closed on the Jones incident will be three years from the date that they initiated the foreclosure action. Or the foreclosure action was initiated.
MR. TREMBLAY:
that I brought up, yes.

I agree that that would deal with the problem

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

It may not have satisfied them.
Right.

MR. EMKIN:
Exactly. It would not satisfy this type of scheme
because you would have a continuing point where you could go after the
original act.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
very reasonable to say to the
scheme, but if you attempt to
property that is the point at
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

Except it seems to me very rational and
commercial world, "You can run that
collect on that scheme by taking the
which the statute commences to run."

Otherwise it continues, no statute.
Otherwise, it's open-ended until you do

that.
MR. EMKIN:
The only question would be, how creative they
become in transferring the property.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: We understand that the talent on the
other side is better than the talent on your side.
MR. EMKIN:

I would differ with that.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
I don't mean any disrespect.
I just
mean the creativity is there, so we might as well not attempt to legislate to block the creativity because the geniuses are incredible when
it cqmes to those kinds of schemes.
But we do need to be rational and
reasonable in how we try to regulate them. We'll figure out how to do
something else to them, when we find out their next step.
MR. BRYON J. GROSS:
I think Mr. Brown has really focused in
on what I was go1ng to po1nt out, an element of the problem.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

State your name for the record.
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MR. GROSS: Yes, my name is Bryon Gross, staff attorney in
the South Centra! office of Legal Aid also. The gentleman speaking on
behalf of Union Horne Loans seemed very concerned about the plaintiff
waiting, storing up his or her damages and waiting to sue and benefitting from the Wyatt rule by doing that. And I think that we really
need to focus on the defendant waiting and not taking action
specifically because of the statute of lirniafion. we had. a case in
our office, actually it was one of Elena's cases.
I'm sure she would
have loved to be here to tell you about it. There was a horne improvement case, it was a home imporvernent case which you've heard so much
about. You looked puzzled, Mr. Brown.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
MR. EMKIN:

I want to know who this Elena is?

Elena is a legal services attorney.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

Oh, I see.

All right.

MR. GROSS: She's a senior attorney in our office and haa
apparently appeared before Mr. Fenton's committee. Anyway, she had
this horne improvement case where a contract was made with the horne
improvement company and sold to a finance agency. The work was never
finished. The finance agency gave the right to rescission notices
long after the contract was done. They were not given at the right
time, and when the client got that, they immediately sent them in and
thought they had rescinded the contract. And therefore it took no
further action. The holder of the contract waited longer than three
years because he knew that that was the statute of limitations for
fraud, and he waited longer than three years, purposely did not make
any attempts to collect payments from people. Didn't make any attempts to collect on the contract. Didn't hassle them or anything,
and then popped up with the foreclosure when he thought the statute
of limitations had run.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: All right. Let me stop you there, Mri
Gross.
Suppose the Iaw was such that from the date they sent that back,
the statute ran, both as to his right to file the claim and their right
obviously to defend it, would not, once he waits that entire period of
time bar him from proceeding?
MR. GROSS:

No, he ...

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Wait a minute, along the foreclosure line?
You follow what I'm suggesting?
MR. GROSS: No, I'm sorry I don't follow you. If he was not
allowed to, if the statute of limitations on his action did not lapse ...
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
MR. GROSS:

He can't foreclose, if he goes beyond.

I think there should be.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

Would that not solve another one of the

problems?
too.

MR. GROSS: Yes it would.
You wouidn 1 t have to ..•
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And that would make it much clearer

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: From the date of the notice of resc ~ion,
the statute commenced to run on his right to foreclosure, and exercise
his rights as the creditor against the debtor.
MR. GROSS: That would somewhat solve the problem. Now, in
this case, it so happened that the people actually sent in a written
notice of rescission. There might be cases where an unsophisticated
homeowner might not actually do that, and I don't think it would completely solve that problem, because the finance agency would still be
able to come in and foreclose after three years.
I don't think that
they should be allowed to wait. We've seen many cases where numerous
finance agencies had just sat on the contracts and waited for years
purposely, you know, to let the statutes run. As long as they have
that economical hold over the person that was pointed out in the Wyatt,
I don't think they should be allowed to use that statute of limitat~ons
to their benefit. The person speaking for Union Home Loans focused on
this 30 years as if it was an incredibly long time, and it was a stale
claim. But the point is, the claim was still alive. That bank or savings and loan or loan broker still has power over that person's property, and is able to come in and foreclose on that property.
I'd just like to point out also that the Wyatt case is not
a fluke case and the other gentleman was speaking about the five consolidated trials in Sacramento. We know there's many Union Home Loan
cases. But Union Home Loan is not the only finance agency that perpetrated this scheme.
I had some clients come in last month. A really
sweet hard-working~elderly~couple. They live in Watts. They worked
all their lives and now they're on Social Security. Their house was
almost entirely paid for, and they just wanted to borrow some money to
do some home improvement. They got a loan for $21,000. About $5,000
of that was for commission and brokers fees.
They were told that they
were going to pay $300 a month and at the end of the year the loan
would be renewed. Now they didn't know what that meant. They thought
well, they said as long as your payments are current your loan will be
renewed. Well fine, but at the end of the year they found out that all
they'd been paying was interest.
It wasn't a renewable loan. The finance agency offered them a new loan. The loan was now $22,000. Now
they owed actually $1,000 more than they did after the first year of
paying $300 a month. Now these people signed the new loan, they didn't
know what else to do. They were up against a foreclosure. Fortunately, they came into me and I'm going to try to get them a legitimate loan from somewhere. They're up against foreclosure now because
they have a year on the second loan as long as they make their payments.
You know, we have time to arrange a fully amortized loan for them from
a legitimate lending agency.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Well, assuming for the sake of discussion
you're not able to get them another loan, you presumably will allege
there's fraud involved.
MR. GROSS: Right, then I'll have to file a lawsuit.
won't be a problem in their case because they discovered it.

But it

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Let's take it a little bit further then.
Let's say that they did come to you and at the end of the year you
haven't been able to put together an amortized loan. And for the next
three years you keep them renewing, and it goes not for $22,000, it's
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now up to $27,000, with the fees and all that other stuff. The original
$21,000 is going up to $27,000, and they've been paying $300 a month for
four years. Under those circumstances when they've been to see you,
and you've laid out to them what their problem is, when should the statute commence to run?
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thanks, Willie, for phrasing my question.

MR. GROSS:
In the circumstances where they've been to see
me? I don't think that that should change it.
I think that as long
as the scheme is going on -- they came to see me and I explained it to
me, and I explained it to them, but they might have come to see someone else.
MR. EMKIN: What if they had gone to a private attorney who
asked for cash up front.
And they were $20.00 over our poverty limit.
They cannot get free legal services. They're not going to get a private lawyer to take their case on spec. And in fact, even though they
might have gotten some legal advice, they couldn't execute.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
they go to you?

Well, wouldn't that lawyer then suggest

MR. EMKIN: They might be $25.00 a month over our very
limited income category.
MR. GROSS: Or they might try to reach us and our appointments might be filled that week. We have a real struggle to satisfy
the legal needs in the community.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
MR. GROSS:
should not toll it.

Okay, go ahead.

That's all I want to say.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:

I feel that that

That's a fair response.

MR. GROSS:
I think that as long as finance agencies continue
their scheme that the clients should be able to sue.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Yes, Allan.

MR. EMKIN:
It was mentioned earlier that bad facts make bad
laws. Well, we're looking a a lot of bad facts throughout the whole
state affecting a whole lot of homeowners. And we didn't create the
bad facts. And I don't think that you should put what I call the clients
of the world in jeopardy because the creator of the bad facts is now
coming up with what I would call, a very, very slender legal argurtent
to safeguard themselves from future attacks against civil conspiracy
in the oast. And one other issue. And that was, as Mr. Brown mentioned,
what about if it was an individual? I think -.if-th-e statute Ts--amerided
it should include individuals who act in a similar manner. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Thank you.

Ron Reiter.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Let me ask one question, Allan.
I gather
that Mr. DeVr1es was not totally accurate when he says only Union Home
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Loan is subject to being handled in the court system by virtue of its
conduct.
You now talked about people who do home improvement loans ...
MR. EMKIN: We're having to raise this type of issue in a
number of aifferent areas of litigation.
ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
MR. EMKIN:

With other commercial lenders?

That's correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN:
I just want to make sure that we were not
using time for only one person, one commercial lender.
MR. DeVRIES: Mr. Brown, may I address that point. What I
said was that the only person who has come forward to ask you for relief was Union Home Loan.
I didn't say they were the only people who
might benefit from what they are asking for.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: While you come up Ron, I'd like to introduce Assemblywoman Maxine Waters from Los Angeles. Okay, Ron.
MR. RONALD REITER: My name is Ronald Reiter, I'm a deputy
Attorney General.
I concur with many of the recent remarks made of
the maintenance the Wyatt rule on civil conspiracies.
It's very clear,
as people have so far testified, that the purpose of the statute of
limitations is to prevent the assertion of stale claims. But a claim
isn't stale when conspiracy is still afoot, and if acts are being done
in furtherance of the cons-piracy. And we believe that the Wyatt case
was correct in holding that so long as acts are done to continue
the conspiracy, as long as these wrongful acts are perpetrated, that
the statute of limitations should not run. The issue of the statute
of limitations in civil conspiracy cases is of increasing significance
to our office because we prosecute cases of wrongdoing civilly, rather
than criminally. And we principally use section 17200 of the Business
and Professions Code as our primary vehicle for civil law enforcement.
Section 17200 has a four year statute of limitations, but unlike the
fraud statute of limitations, which runs from discovery, the four
year statute of limitations in 17200 runs from the time of accrual
of the cause of action.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
Ron, if you get complaints about any particular group perpetrat~ng more than one fraud or scheme, I'm not
going to mention any names here, do you do anything? Do you investigate that group? Do you understand my question?
MR. REITER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Yes we do.
I imagine that's where you come in.

MR. REITER: That's right.
Sometimes we are able to unearth
things on our own through investigation. Other times cases are brought
to us by complainants.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Mr. Emkin and others here are indicating
there are some outfits, and we won't mention names, who presumably are
pursuing a questionable course of conduct. Do they bring these complaints to you, and you then investigate?
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to obtain restitution under certain circumstances. But since the tocus
of the office is more toward law enforcement than it is to representing ...
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
I'm not criticizing.
my own mine now it functions.

I'm trying to get in

MR. REITER: Yes. Because we don't represent individualized
interests of tne people, we try to get what we deem as appropriate
restitution. But our primary thrust is to enjoin the continued wrongful activity, to stop the violations and also to penalize those violations.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Excuse me, one other thing.
If in your
investigation you were to find another 20 individuals with the same
type of contract, but haven't got to the point where the foreclosure
has started, do you do anything about those cases?
MR. REITER: Absolutely. As a matter of fact very frequently
we find out about cases only through one complainant, and then through
the process of investigation, we may find ~00 or 1,000. And then we
proceed to begin enjoining the unlawful acts, but also, to the extent
that we can, obtain restitution for everybody whose been harmed.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: So you can then in effect prevent some of
the things from occurring to other people?
MR. REITER: That's right. As a matter of fact, I'm currently engagea in a case right now against a major home improvement contractor, an air conditioning company, that operates throughout the
State of California. We're attempting to obtain foreclosure relief
and the invalidation of about fifteen to twenty thousands of deeds
of trust that have been placed on homes throughout the State of California. Our perspective as a law enforcement agency and a public
agency, is slightly different of course than, than legal aid in the
consumer type matters. That's why we of course are interested in obtaining restitution. And I mentioned our primary thrust is to prevent
the continued violations of the law, and also to penalize those violations. Because our statute doesn't have us go from time of discovery,
we have to sometimes rely on the civil conspiracy statute to reach
those people who have been involved in concocting the scheme and in
carrying it on. For example, the Legislature recently addressed the
issue of people at foreclosure sales who conspire among themselves to
supress bidding so that there isn't a high enough price bid at the
sale. It's very hard sometimes to get into conspiracies such as that,
but we think we're going to be getting into one of them. And from information that we have, five or six people have been engaging in this
practice for about a twenty year period. And they have literally
siphoned off millions and millions of dollars which would otherwise
have gone to homeowners facing foreclosure after the sale had occurred.
We're just finding out about it now, and we see that it is a continuing
conspiracy. If the Wyatt rule were changed and we were limited to a
statute of limitations of three or four years, it would be seventeen
years worth of ill-gotten gains that we would not be able to reach.
So it's very important for us to maintain the Wyatt theory.
Similarly, there are numerous instances in the foreclosure
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CHAIRMAN FENTON:
MR. REITER:

Thank you very much, Ron.

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN FENTON:

Doug McKee.

MR. DOUGLAS McKEE: Mr. Chairman, and members.
I am Douglas
McKee for the California District Attorneys Association. Mr. Reiter
has basically laid out what are the powers of the Attorney General.
They basically parallel the powers that the local prosecutors have in
this area and the advantages that the Wyatt case would have to the
local prosecutor.
I want to state on behalf of the California D. A.'s
Association that we do support retention of the rule as stated in the
Wyatt case. Now I'm not arguing in this instance whether or not that
created a new rule or merely restated the rule as it was.
But in any
event, we do support retention of the Wyatt rule. Part of the reason
for that is that as the first speaker for Union Home Loan stated, it's
really a balance that we're talking about. A balance with regard to
stale evidence, and a balan9e between the plaintiff and the defendant.
For the California D. A.'s Association, in most instances and including
this instance, we balance in favor of giving the trier of fact the
greatest amount of evidence so that they can seek the truth.
And that's
the purpose of a trial.
In either a criminal trial, or a civil trial,
the trier of fact should have as much evidence as possible.
It's the
decision of the trier of fact whether or not that evidence is stale,
whether or not the people or a private individual has sustained his or
her burden. And again, we think that it's incorrect to shorten the
statute of limitations in this instance.
It changed the law because
that would in effect, remove from the trier of fact, evidence that may
be of value in cases. And in most instances, including this one, we're
opposed to eliminating the limitation of evidence.
With regard to conspiracies, Mr. Reiter pointed out, in many
instances you can, and that's been the theory in criminal law, that conspiracies generally have the capacity beyond the capacity of an individual to do harm.
So the law has generally regarded conspiracies with
stiffer penalties.
I agree with Mr. Reiter.
If I had a decision to
make on this thing, I would get rid of what appears to have been an
anomaly and I would apply the Wyatt rule also to individuals, and get
rid of what may appear to be an ~llogical distinction in this matter.
Because again, we think it's very, very important to let the trier of
fact have as much evidence as possible to decide what the truth is in
the matter.
·
At least initially we agree with the suggestion of Mr. Brown
with regard to foreclosures. We would at least initially support that
proposed amendment to the law.
But we do oppose, from the California's
D. A.'s Association, changing the standard in Wyatt. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FENTON:
Thank you, Doug. Before I call the next
and last witness, there's a statement here from the State Division of
Consumer Services who couldn't be here, supporting the Wyatt decision.
We'll make their statement a matter of record.l Kathleen Hamilton.
MS. KATHLEEN HAMILTON:
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Comm~ttee. My name is Kathleen Hamilton, and I'm the
1
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Director of Consumer Affairs for Stanislaus County.
I'm also here this
morning representing the California Consumer Affairs Association, which
is the statewide affiliation of local government consumer affairs programs.
Local consumer affairs agencies have two primary responsibilitiesi providing one-on-one consumer counseling and dispute mediation
when questions or problems arise out of marketplace transactions. As
we provide these services on a daily basis, we're in a particularly
credible position to observe typical consumer behavior and talent as
well as to assess the most persistent and solution-resistant problems
encountered in the business-consumer arena.
I'm here this morning to join some of the other witnesses to
express my enthusiasm for the court's decision in Wyatt v. Union
Mortgage.
I believe its net impact will be to afford consumers needed
protect1on, and most importantly, latitude in those instances where
lack of guile and sophistication creates a host environment for victimization. The behavior and naivete of the Wyatts throughout their
transaction with Union Mortgage Company represent typical consumer behavior, and while unfortunate, that is also, in my opinion, excusable
and understandable behavior. Given the vast array of transactions the
average consumer can be expected to participate in in the course of a
lifetime, the contemporary technology of many of those transactions,
and the complexity of the legal labyrinth, it's unreasonable to expect
the average consumer to possess sufficient knowledge and ability to
protect himself or herself from the unscrupulous.
It is therefore
extraordinarily important that the court afford maximum opportunity for
the consuming public to recognize a wrong, and to seek redress for that
wrong.
I have had frequent conversations over the years with consumers as well as with administrative and law enforcement officials on.
the frustration of legitimate claims because the statute of limitations
might arguably have expired. Consumers, trusting as the Wyatts were,
are unaware of very concept of the statute of limitations and will unwittingly spend an inordinate period of time in the pursuit of informal resolution, before finally contacting a consumer agency or legal
counsel. Consumers may even become convinced by the perpetrators themselves that their cimplaint is without merit. An article which appeared
earlier this year in Psychology Today Magazine, discussed the interesting psychological relationship that can exist between business and
the complaining consumer. The unfair business entrepreneur is highly
skilled at manipulating consumer conduct, at undermining self esteem
and confidence, and at creating the illusion of mutual trust and support. The resulting erosion of self-protecting assertiveness contributes to the problem of unchecked public abuse.
I believe the element of conspiracy, which is at the very
heart of the Wyatt case, is its own best argument against the fear of
vulnerability to stale claims. Where there is an incumbent responsibility to convince the court of the existence of a continuing conspiracy before asserting that a statute of limitations continues to run,
there's virtually no danger of a truly stale claim being preserved.
As a non-attorney who frequently finds legal jargon confusing, I believe that the semantics are beautifully adequate here.
It seems to
me that continuing cannot equal stale.
-30-

I would like to make a few brief observations in closing.
One, my review of the issue convinces me that the Wyatt decision did
not create any new law, it merely affirmed, with useful specificity,
legislative intent in previous court decisions. Second, the nature of
thP abuses which were alleged in the W~att case has particular significance for effective consumer protect~on law enforcement. The element
of misrepresentation that was at the core of the Wyatt case is at the
core of most consumer fraud cases.
Lastly, it seems to me that a critical issue here is the
nature of a conspiracy. Civil conspiracies, are by their very essence,
designed to confuse and befuddle the victim. Their success depends
upon the extent to which they are able to keep a consumer in the dark.
Given that, in consort with the inherent imbalance of power and knowledge
in the relationship, the equity of providing maximum opportunity for
relief becomes evident. To do less would merely offer judicial sanction
to the most successful conspiracies. The message would be that it's
okay to defraud the public if you can just keep them on your side long
enough • . We're grateful for the court's resistance to that kind of reward, and we encourage the Committee's commensurate resistance to any
efforts to mitigate the application of the Wyatt decision.
I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to be here this
morning and appreciate your willingness to hear from a non-attorney.
CHAIRMAN FENTON: Thank you very much Kathleen. Any questions?
I want to thank you all for appearing here, helping us with this very,
very important and difficult problem, and with that this hearing is
adjourned. Thank you.

# # # # # #
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October 23, 1980

TO:

Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee

FROM:

Ray LeBov

RE:

Hearing on Statute of Limitations in Civil
Conspiracies

On October 27, 1980, the Assembly Judiciary Committee
will hold an interim hearing on the statute of limitations
in civil conspiracies. The hearing is scheduled to begin
at 9:30 a.m. at the California Museum of Science and
Industry, Space Building, Muses Room, 700 State Drive,
Exposition Park in Los Angeles.
The purpose of the memorandum is to provide background
information that may be of interest to you in preparation
for the hearing.
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The collective term "statute of limitations" is commonly
applied to a great number of statutes which prescribe the
time periods within which suits may be brought.
The main purpose of statutes of limitations is "to promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to
defend within the period of limitation and that the right
to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over
the right to prosecute them."
(Order of R. R. Telegrafhers
v Railway Exp. Agency, 321 u. s. 342 (1944)).
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The chief statutes of limitations are in Code of Civil
Procedure Sections 312 through 363, but there are others
throughout the various codes.
CCP Section 312, the section introducing the limitation
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, states that
civil actions can only be commenced within the prescribed
periods "after the cause of action shall have accrued."
Generally, the cause of action accrues when the wrongful
act is done and the obligation or liability arises. Strict
application of this general rule could produce unfair results. Therefore, a number of exceptions have been statutorily and judicially created. The most important and
common exception to the general rule of accrual is the
postponing of the running of the statute on certain causes
of action until the facts constituting the cause have been discovered.
Some examples are actions (1) based on fraud or mistake
(CCP Sec. 338(4), (2) based on breach of fiduciary duty
(CCP Sec. 343), (3) for malpractice (CCP Sec. 340.5), and
(4) based on rescission of contract (CCP Sees. 337(3) and
339(3)).
CIVIL CONSPIRACIES
A civil conspiracy is not in itself actionable.
It is a
means by which two or more persons who agree to perform a
wrongful act may each be held liable for the resulting damage, regardless whether they actually commit the tort themselves.
The basis for an action charging civil conspiracy is not the
agreement itself, but the damage suffered as the result of
a tort or torts committed in furtherance of a joint design.
There is no civil cause of action unless a wrongful act, resulting in damage to the plaintiff, is alleged and proven.
Therefore, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
at the time of the agreement; the cause of action does not
accrue until an overt act constituting a tort is ei~her done
or discovered, whichever the controlling statute provides.
Additionally, in Wyatt v Union Home Mortgage Co., 24 Cal.
3d 773 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that when
a civil conspiracy is properly alleged and proved, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run on any part
of the plaintiff's claims until the "last overt act" pursuant to the conspiracy has been completed.
WYATT V UNION HOME MORTGAGE CO.
In this case, the plaintiff alleged and proved a conspiracy
to commit fraud and breach of a fiduciary duty.
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The complaint was based on Union's misleading television
commercials, its misrepresentation about the terms of a
loan (including the interest rate, the amount of the loan
payment, and the policy on late charges), its failure to
call plaintiff's attention to unfavorable provisions buried
in the loan papers, and its extraction of late charges on a
second loan despite the timely payment of all installments.
The complaint alleged that all of the foregoing resulted
from a fraudulent conspiracy engaged in by all of the defendants {Union Mortgage Co., its affiliated corporations,
their principal shareholders, and several of the corporation's officers and directors.)
If the statute of limitations were to run from the "accrual"
of the cause of action as defined in Section 338 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (that is, from the discovery of the
fraudulent acts), then some of the plaintiff's claims in
Wyatt would not have been asserted within the three year
per1od that is permitted in such actions. However, under
the "last overt act" rule, all of plaintiffs claims were
timely brought.
In holding that the "last overt act" delays the running
of the statute of limitations, the Court reasoned that "so
long as a person continues to commit wrongful acts in fur~
therance of a conspiracy to harm another, he can neither
claim unfair prejudice at the filing of a claim against
him nor disturbance of any justifiable repose built upon
the passage of time." W*att, {Supra at p. 787.)
The
Court pointed out that t e defendants had continued their
tortious conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy until
{and even after) the filing of the complaint. The majority
opinion further stated that "When, as here, the underlying
fraud is a continuing wrong, a convincing rationale exists
for delaying the running of the statute of limitations.
Just as the statute of limitations does not run against
an action based on fraud so long as the fraud remains concealed, so ought the statute to be tolled even after the
fraud is discovered, for so long as the sheer economic
duress or undue influence embedded in the fraud continues
to hold the victim in place." (p. 788)
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Richardson argued that
the "last overt act" doctrine should not be applied in
civil cases. He stated that acceptance of that rule amounts
to a concession that the continuing unlawful scheme is in
itself a tort. Further, Justice Richardson contended that
the "last overt act" rule is not justified by the equitable
considerations raised in its defense. He distinguished the
rule from other safeguards, such as delaying accrual until
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the discovery of the claim, which have been developed "to
assure that the strong public policies represented by the
statute of limitations do not foreclose a plaintiff's
remedy for wrongs committed against him .••. In contrast,
the 'last overt act' doctrine operates mechanically, without reference to plaintiff's diligence, affording plaintiff
the bonanza of a tolled statute for torts upon which he
long since should have commenced suit."
(p. 785)
The dissenting opinion argued that the rule "encourages
injured parties to sit by until the conspirational scheme
has operated with full force and has run its extended
ultimate course." This rule, Justice Richardson concluded,
" •.. defeats the purposes of the statute of limitations while
serving no legitimate needs of injured plaintiffs."
(p. 796)
ALTERNATIVES
The purpose of this hearing is to examine whether the
Legislature should amend, repeal, or let stand the "last
overt act" rule of Wyatt.
There is no specific legislative proposal before the Committee relating to the statute of limitations in civil conspiracies. However, on April 30, 1980 this Committee
passed AB 2382 (McVittie) by a vote of 8-2. As passed by
the Committee, AB 2382 would have amended Section 338 of
the Code of Civil Procedure to provide that, in actions for
relief on the ground of fraud or mistake, the occurrence
of any overt act subsequent to discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake would not toll the statute
of limitations.
In addition, AB 2382 would have added
Section 354.5 to the Code of Civil Procedure to provide
that, in all tort actions (whether the defendant has acted
independently, jointly or in concert or combination), the
time for commencement of an action against shall not be
extended because of the occurrence of any overt act in
furtherance of the tort which occurs subsequent to the
time of the initial injury or damage to the plaintiff
from the tort.
The above provisions of AB 2382 were subsequently dropped
by the bill's author.
The bill was enacted (Chapter 1307,
Statutes of 1980), but,as chaptered, contained only provisions unrelated· to the statute of limitations in civil
conspiracies.
Proponents of abolishing the "last overt act" rule have
argued:
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WYATT v. UNION
24Cal.3d773. 157

[S.F. No. 23748. Aug. lO.

I

JOSEPH R. WYATT et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v.
UNION MORTGAGE COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellants.

SUMMARY

Plaintiffs brought an action against a
loan broker, its
and several of the
affiliated corporations, their principal
corporations' officers
directors, seeking compensatory and punitive
· damages for breach of duties allegedly owed to plaintiffs during the
negotiation of a second mortgage loan. The complaint alleged that the
broker's misleading television commercials, its misrepresentations about
the terms of the initial loan. including the interest rate, the amount of the
loan payment and the policy on late charges, its failure to call plaintiff's
attention to unfavorable provisions buried in the loan papers, and its
extraction of late charges on the second loan despite the timely payment
of all installments, was a breach of the fiduciary duty which is owed by a
mortgage loan broker to those who engage its brokerage services. The
complaint further alleged that
foregoing resulted from a fraudulent
conspiracy engaged in by all of the defendants. The jury assessed separate
awards against each defendant, totalling $25,000 in compensatory
damages and $200.000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied
defendants' motion for new trial after plaintiffs consented to a reduction
of the compensatory award to $1,000. (Superior Court of El Dorado
County, No. 22595, Charles F. Fogerty, Judge.)
The Supreme Court
The court
jury justifiably
concluded that the broker did not satisfy its fiduciary obligation of
disclosure and good faith toward plaintiffs in regard to the initial loan by
its materially misleading and incomplete information given in response to
plaintiffs' questions about rate of interest, late payments, and the size of
the balloon payment due at the end of the loan period. The court also
the second
held there was substantial evidence of actual fraud involved
loan, arising out of defendants charging plaintiffs with several late
charges in the absence of any evidence that such charges were proper.
[Aug. 1979}
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WYATT v. UNION MoRTGAGE Co.
24 Cal.3d 773; !57 Cai.Rptr. 392. 598 P.2d 45

Noting that the record disclosed a tightly knit, family-oriented business
operation under the principal shareholders' dose personal control, the
court held the breaches of fiduciary duties owed to plaintiffs were
undertaken pursuant to established company policies agreed to by each
of the defendants. The court further held that when a civil conspiracy is
properly alleged and proved, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run on any part of the plaintiff's claims until the "last overt act" pursuant
to the conspiracy has been completed, and the "last overt act" was
defendants' collection a few weeks before trial of the final payment of the
seco!ld loan. Accordingly, the court held the trial court correctly refused
to instruct the jury on the statute of limitations. The court also held the
evidence was sufficient to justify awarding punitive damages, and that the
amount awarded was not excessive. (Opinion by Bird; C. J., with
Tobriner, Mosk, Manuel and Newman, JJ., concurring. Separate concurring and dissenting opinion by Richardson, J., with Clark, J., concurring.)

HEAD NOTES
Classified to California Digest of Official Reports, 3d Series

(l)

Brokers § 22-Duties and Liabilities of Brokers-Duty of Full
Disclosure-Mortgage Loan Broker.-A mortgage loan broker is
customarily
by a borrower to act as the borrower's agent in
negotiating an acceptable loan. All persons engaged in this business
are required to obtain real estate licenses. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§§ 10130 and 10131, subd. (d).) Thus, general principles of agency
(Civ. Code, §§ 2228 and 2322, subd. (3)), combine with statutory
duties created by the Real Estate Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 10176,
subds. (a), (i)), to impose on mortgage loan brokers an obligation to
make a full and accurate disclosure of the terms of a loan to
the utmost good faith toward their
borrowers and to act always
principals. A real estate licensee is charged with the duty of fullest
disclosure of all material facts concerning the transaction that might
affect the principal's decision.

(2)

Brokers § 22-Duties and Liabilities of Brokers-Duty of Full
Disclosure-Breach-Mortgage Loan Brokers.-In an action by
borrowers against a mortgage loan broker for breach of its fiduciary
duty, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the
broker did not satisfy its fiduciary obligations of disclosure and good
faith in regard to a loan, where, while the borrowers did not read the
[Aug. 1979]
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written loan documents before signing them, they did
broker
about the rate of interest, late payments, and the size of the baBoon
payment due at
end
the loan period,. and in response to their
questions received materially misleading and incomplete information.
[See Cai.Jur.3d, Brokers,§ 70; Arn.Jur.2d, Brokers,§§ 84, 85.J
(3)

Insurance Companies § 9-Agents and Brokers for lnsurer-Disclosure.-Oral misrepresentations made by an agent to a policy holder
are actionable, despite the fact that the written policy itself
accurately discloses all terms. If the agent of the insurer undertakes
to advise a policy holder, it is his duty to make no false or
misleading statement in that respect.

(4)

Brokers § 22-Duties and Liabilities of Brokers--Duty of Full
Disclosure-Mortgage Loan Brokers.-The rule that a fiduciary's
duty may extend beyond bare written disclosure of the terms of a
transaction to duties of oral disclosure and counseling, applies to
transactions with mortgage loan brokers. Accordingly, where a
husband and wife were persons of modest means and limited
experience in financial affairs, whose equity in their home was their
principal . asset, and who retained a mortgage loan· broker to
negotiate for them highly complex loan terms, and where they may
be assumed to have justifiably relied on the broker's expertise, the
broker's failure to disclose orally the true rate of interest, the penalty
for late payments or the swollen size of a balloon payment
constituted a breach of the broker's fiduciary obligations.

· (5)

Brokers § 23-Duties and Liabilities of Brokers-Actions Against
Brokers--Mortgage Loan Broker-Fraud.-In an action by borrowers against a mortgage loan broker, there ·was evidence of actual
fraud involved in the loan, where the borrowers testified that,
mindful of late charges incurred on a prior loan, they made timely
payment of all installments on the second loan, but the broker
nevertheless charged the borrowers with several late charges, and
where the broker introduced no evidence to support the contention
that such late charges were proper. The jury could reasonably have
inferred that the late fees were erroneously imposed and that the
error was part of a scheme to defraud the borrowers.

(6)

Conspiracy § 12--Ch·ii-Eiements.-As long as two or more persons
agree to perform a wrongful act, the law places civil liability for the
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resulting damage on all of them, regardless of whether they actually
commit the tort themselves. Accordingly, a plaintiff is entitled to
damages from those defendants who concurred in the tortious
unlawful purpose. Furthermore, the
scheme with knowledge of
requisite concurrence
knowledge may be inferred from the
nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the
alleged conspirators, and other circumstances. Tacit consent as well
as express approval will suffice to hold a person liable as a
coconspirator.
(7)

Corporations § 39-0fficers and Agents-Liability-Torts.-Directors and officers of a corporation are not rendered personally liable
for its torts merely by reason of their official positions, but may
become liable they directly ordered, authorized or participated in
the tortious conduct. Personal liability, if otherwise justified, may
rest on a conspiracy among the officers and
to injure third
parties through the corporation.

(8)

Corporations § 30-Stockhotders-Liability-Torts.---,Shareholders
of a corporation are not normally liable for its torts, but personal
the "alter ego"
liability may attach to them through application
doctrine, or when
shareholder specifically directed or authorized
the wrongful acts.

(9)

Conspiracy § 15-Civii-Actions-Evidence-Mortgage Loan
Brokers--Corporations, Shareholders, Officers and Directors.-In
an action against a mortgage loan broker, its affiliated corporations,
their principal shareholder, and several of the corporations' officers
and directors, alleging that the broker's misleading television
commercials, its misrepresentations about the terms of a loan, its
failure to can plaintiffs'
to unfavorable provisions in the
loan papers, and its
of late charges on a loan despite the
timely payment of an installments, breached the fiduciary duty owed
to plaintiffs. the evidence was sufficient to show a conspiracy among
all defendants.
showed it was company policy to lure
potential
such as plaintiffs into their offices through
misleading
and switch" advertising, that the principal shareholder instructed
officials that late charges were a
and
it was company policy that if the
great source of
would automatifirst payment was late,
the rest of
knit, family oriented
cally be late. Further,
operation under
personal control,
{Aug. 1979]
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and
was an
or
of
one
each was active in some
at some time during the years when the
management
conspiracy was alleged to have occurred. Moreover, all the headquarters offices of the corporations were in the same building.
(lO) Limitation of Actions § 30-Commencement of Period-Civil Con-

spiracy-Last Overt Act.-When a civil conspiracy is properly
alleged and proved, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
on any part of a plaintiff's claims until the "last overt act" pursuant
to the conspiracy has been completed. Accordingly, in an action by
borrowers against a mortgage loan broker and other related defendants in which liability was premised on the theory of civil conspiracy
through a breach of duties owed to plaintiff during the negotiation
of a mortgage loan, the last overt act was defendants' collection a
few weeks before trial of the final payment of the loan and,
accordingly, the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on
the statute of limitations.
(11) Limitation of Actions § 3-Nature and Purpose.-Statutes of limitations have, as their general purpose, to provide repose and protect
persons against the burden of having to defend against stale claims.
So long -as a person continues to commit wrongful acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to harm another, he can neither claim unfair
prejudice at the filing of a claim against him nor disturbance of any
justifiable repose built on the passage of time.
(12) Limitation of Actions § 57-Tolling or Suspension of StatuteFraud-Continuing Wrong.-When the underlying fraud
a cause
of action is a continuing wrong, a convincing rationale exists for
delaying the running of the statute of limitations. Just as the statute
of limitations does not run against an action based on fraud so long
as the fraud remains concealed, so ought the statute to be tolled even
after the fraud is discovered, for so long as the sheer economic
duress or undue influence embedded in the fraud continues to hold
the victim in place.
(13) Damages § 25-Exemplary or Punitive Damages-Persons LiableMortgage Loan Brokers.-Where there was substantial evidence to
support the jury's determination that mortgage loan brokers were
guilty of fraud when they conspired to breach their fiduciary duty
toward plaintiffs for whom they negotiated a Joan, punitive damages
were appropriate.
[Aug 1979]
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(14) Damages § Hi--Excessive and Inadequate Damages--Punitive

Damages.-In an action against a mortgage loan broker, its affiliated
corporations, their principal shareholder, and several of the corporations' officers and directors for fraud and breach of fiduciary duties
during the negotiation of a mortgage loan, an award of $200,000 in
punitive damages, apportioned among eight corporate and individual defendants. was not excessive, where the concealment from
borrowers of the company policy regarding fraudulent collection of
late charges comprised the core of defendants' wrongful conduct,
and where plaintiffs introduced direct evidence showing that the late
charge policy brought in millions of dollars during the years
plaintiffs' loans were being serviced. Moreover, the structure of the
corporations was such that the jury could reasonably infer that the
individual defendants had personally profited from the wrongful
conduct. The purpose of punitive damages is to penalize wrongdoers
in a way that will deter them and others from repeating the wrongful
conduct in the future.
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OPINION

BIRD, C. J.- This is ari appeal brought by a mortgage loan broker, its
affiliated corporations, their principal
and several of the
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corporations' officers and directors from a judgment which imposed on
them compensatory and punitive damages for breach of duties which
were allegedly owed to respondents during the negotiation of a second
mortgage loan. Liability of all but one of the appdlants is premised on a
theory of civil conspiracy. Appellants contend that (1) the record discloses
neither the breach of a duty nor the existence of a conspiracy, (2) the trial
court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations on respondents'
claims was tolled until the "last overt act" in the conspiracy, and (3)
punitive damages were excessive.
I

Stockton Home Mortgage Company (Stockton) and Union Home
Loans (formerly Union Mortgage Company) (Union) are affiliated
corporations engaged in the mortgage loan brokerage business. Stockton
operates primarily in northern California, while Union's business is
confined to the southern part of the state. Appellant Western Computer
Service (Western) is the servicing agent for loans negotiated by Stockton
and Union, and appellant Secured Investment Corporation (Secured) is
its predecessor. Appellant Irving Tushner (Tushner) is the principal and
controlling shareholder of Stockton, Union, Western and Secured. All of
the corporations use the business name "Union Home Loans" and are
headquartered· at the same Los Angeles address. Appellants Esther Flink
(Flink) and Elinore Tushner are Tushner's sister and former wife,
respectively; each served one or more of the appellant corporations as an
officer or director during some or all of the time described in the
complaint. . Appellant David Marks (Marks) served as president of
Secured and Western during a portion of the period at issue.
The essential facts elicited at trial, viewed most favorably to respondents, appear as follows: In 1966, Stockton carried on an extensive
television advertising campaign in the Sacramento area. One frequently
aired advertisement announced that a $1,000 loan could be paid back
completely. principal and interest, for $!8 per month. In fact, no such
loan was available.
Lured by the advertising claims, respondents, Joseph and Clarice
Wyatt, visited Stockton's Sacramento office in November 1966. They
sought to retain Stockton's services to negotiate a second mortgage loan
on their home for purposes of completing certain home improvements.
(Such loans are solicited by mortgage brokers from private, noninstitutional lenders.) Respondents agreed in writing to a loan negotiated by
[Aug. 1979]
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Stockton
gross amount
$1,325 (including the brokerage fee and
of $20 per month over 36 months (the
closing charges).
1966 loan). The
orally advised respondents that a "small"
balloon payment
due in the 37th month. (A balloon payment is
the amount
to
and interest unpaid at
maturity when
have been insufficient
to do so.)
as a construction laborer,
officer about the "grace
respondents
that
a late charge would not
period"
days overdue. In response to
be assessed
interest rate, the loan officer
respondents'
quoted a figure
produced a "stack" of loan
a promissory note, escrow
officer leafed through the
showing respondents where to
out significant provisions of the written
respondents read them carefully. The loan
annual interest rate of !0 percent,
delinquent payments, and
loan balance for each
installment). The actual
were timely paid,
as $950.70. However, the
provided that
installments would
charges and interest, rather than to
principal would thus be deferred until
additional interest in the interim. All
balloon ·payment.
Respondents were
Consequently,
more than the

their payments on the 1966 loan.
in March 1970 of $1 ,340,
respondents asked why the
and interest provisions of the
Stockton refused to extend the
were unable to find other
they agreed to refinance the unpaid
1970 loan) was then negotiated in
payments of $45 per
disclosed an estimated balance
late
!Aug !979}
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were
term of the
maturity (April I

were
actual amount demanded
was $1,193.16.

the

After repeated threats
foreclosure on their home. respondents
brought suit
July 1973. Their complaint alleged.
substance, that
Stockton's misleading television commercials, its misrepresentations
about the terms
the I
loan, its failure to call respondents' attention
to the very unfavorable provisions buried in the
papers, and its
extraction of late charges on the 1970 loan despite the timely payment of
all installments, breached the fiduciary duty which is owed by a mortgage
loan broker to
engage
brokerage services. The complaint
further alleged that the foregoing resulted from a fraudulent conspiracy
engaged in by all
the appellants. Respondents sought compensatory
and punitive damages, and imposition of a constructive trust
The parties
to the issuance of a preliminary lllJUnction
staying the foreclosure on respondents' residence
a final deterwere paid
mination of the action, and for so long as monthly
toward the balance claimed due. In June 1975, two weeks before trial,
respondents, finding other financing, repaid the 1970 loan.
To prove the
of a conspiracy among the appellants, respondents produced, at trial, a former employee who had prepared some of
the advertising
affiliated corporations after I966. Confirming the
use of the misleading television commercials in Sacramento during 1966,
this employee testified
appellant Tushner had frequently stated, in
meetings attended by all of the other individual appellants except Flink,
that it was company policy to purs4e late charges vigorously as a prime
source of
and that, if one payment was delinquent, an subsequent payments were also to be considered late.
income
figures for
and Western were introduced at trial
the years
1966 through
the annual amounts
from approximately
$152,000 in 1966 to over $1 million
the two corporations combined in
1971.

The individual appellants were beyond subpoena range and declined
to testify at triaL However, respondents read into
record selected
portions of appellants' depositions, which described the corporate positions occupied by each and their respective duties. The jury assessed
separate awards against each appellant, totalling $25,000 in compensatory
damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied
[Aug. 1')791
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appellants' motion
new trial after respondents consented to a
reduction of the compensatory award to $1,000.

II
This court must first decide whether the jury verdict is supported by
evidence that the appellants did in fact breach fiduciary obligations owed
to the respondents.
take the position that their duty of
disclosure was fully met
they presented to respondents written loan
documents containing all the inform1tion required by Business and
Professions Code section 1024l.l Appellants also claim they never
charged respondents' account with late charges unless payments were
actually overdue.
(l) A mortgage loan broker is customarily retained by a borrower to
act as the borrower's agent in negotiating an acceptable loan. All persons
California are required to obtain real estate
engaged in this business
§§ 10130 and
1, subd. (d).) Thus,
lkenses. (Bus. & Prof.
general principles of agency (Civ. Code, §§ 2228 and 2322, subd. 3)
combine with statutory duties created by the Real Estate Law (see Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 10176, subds. (a), (i)) to impose upon mortgage loan
brokers an obligation to make a full and accurate disclosure of the terms
of a loan to borrowers and to act always in the utmost good faith toward
their principals. "The law imposes on a real estate agent 'the same
and loyalty that it imposes on a trustee in
obligation of undivided
favor of his beneficiary.' [Citations.] This relationship not only imposes
upon him
the highest good faith toward his principal
~ut precludes
agent from obtaining any advantage over the principal
in any transaction had by virtue of his agency. [Citation.]" (Batson v.
Strehlow (1968) 68 Cal.2d 662, 674-675 [68 Cal.Rptr. 589, 441 P.2d 101].)
A rea] estate licensee is "charged with the duty of fullest disclosure of all
material facts concerning the transaction that might affect the principal's
decision. [Citations.]" (Rattray v. Scudder (1946) 28 CaL2d 214, 223 [169
P.2d 371, 164 A.L.R. 1356]; see also Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith (1973)
[
Cal.Rptr. 71]; Smith v. Zak (1971) 20
32 Cai.App.3d 204, 2
Cal.App.3d 785, 792-793 [98 CaLRptr. 242].)

(2) In the present case, respondents testified they did not read the
stack of written
documents before signing them in 1966. However,
respondents
the broker about the rate of interest, late payments,
and the size of the
payment due at the end of the loan period. In
1The 1973 amendments to the Jaw on real property loans (Bus. & Prof. Code,§ 10241.1
et seq.) are not
to the
case.
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response to their questions, respondents received the materially misleading and incomplete information already described in
opinion. (Ante,
pp. 779, 780.) Given this evidence, the jury. justifiably concluded that
Stockton did not satisfy its fiduciary obligations of disclosure and good
faith toward its principal in regard to the 1966 loan.
(3) In the context of insurance policies, this court has long recognized
that oral misrepresentations made by an agent to a policyholder are
actionable, despite the fact that the written policy itself accurately
discloses all terms. "[IJf the agent of the insurer undertakes to advise [a
policyholderJ, ... it should be the duty of such representative to make no
false or misleading statement in that respect." (Glickman v. New York
Life Ins. Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 626, 634 [107 P.2d 252, 131 A.L.R. 1292].)
Other cases have similarly held that the existence of a confidential
relationship may justify reliance upon oral misrepresentation of the terms
of a contract. (See Security-First Nat. Bank v. Earp (1942) 19 Cal.2d 774,
777 [122 P.2d 900]; Kloehn v. Prendiville (1957) 154 Cai.App.2d 156,
161-162 [316 P.2d 17].)
(4) There is a second reason why appellants breached their fiduciary
obligations toward respondents. In the context of insurance policies, this
court has recognized that a fiduciary's duty may extend beyond bare
written disclosure of the terms of a transaction to duties of oral disclosure
and counseling. The leading case is Raulet v. Northwestern etc. Ins. Co.
(1910) 157 Cal. 213 [107 P. 292], where this court refused to enforce a
clause in a fire insurance policy on furniture which voided the policy if
the property was or became encumbered with a chattel mortgage. The
court wrote as follows: "'It is a matter almost of common knowledge that
a very small percentage of policy-holders are actually cognizant of the
provisions of their policies .... The policies are prepared by the experts
of the companies. they are highly technical in their phraseology, they are
complicated and voluminous .... The insured usually confides implicitly
in the agent securing the insurance, and it is only just and equitable that
the company should be required to call specifically to the attention of the
policy-holder such provisions as the one before us.' " (ld, at p. 230, italics
added; see also Motor T Co. v. Great American Indem. Co. (1936) 6
Cal.2d 439, 444 [58 P.2d 374]; Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra,
16 Cal.2d at pp. 631-632.)
The reasoning of these cases applies to transactions with mortgage loan
brokers as well. Here, the record discloses that respondents were persons
of modest means and limited experience in financial affairs, whose equity
[Aug. 1979]
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in their home was their principal asset. They retained a mortgage loan
broker to negotiate for them highly complex loan terms and they may be
assumed to have justifiably relied on the latter's expertise. Against such a
backdrop. the broker's failure to disclose orally the true rate of interest,
the penalty for late payments or
swollen size of the balloon payment
clearly constituted breach of the broker's fiduciary obligations. It is
noteworthy also that the provisions regarding interest rate, late charges
and balloon payment were
unfavorable to the borrower and yet
the broker made no attempt to
his clients' attention to these matters.
(5) The evidence of
fraud involved in the 1970 loan is a third
reason for finding the appellants guilty of breaching their fiduciary duties.
Respondents testified that, mindful of the late charges incurred on the
first loan, they made timely payment of all installments until February
1972. Thereafter, payments were made by respondents' disability insurer
and the timeliness of those payments is not
Nevertheless,
appellants charged the Wyatt account on the 1970
with several late
charges. At triaL they introduced no
to support their
contention that these late charges were proper. The jury once more could
reasonably have inferred that the
fees were erroneously imposed and
that the error was part of a
to defraud respondents.

III
Appellants next contend
there 1s no substantial evidence of a
conspiracy.
stress
Stockton participated in
t.he making
to
Wyatts;
tha-t none of them
had knowledge of what the employees of Stockton discussed with the
Wyatts during the loan transactions.
Appellants mischaracterize what is necessary to support a finding of a
civil conspiracy. (6) As long as two or more persons agree to perform a
wrongful act. the law places civil liability for the resulting damage on all
of them. regardless of
they actually commit the tort themselves.
(Unruh v. Truck
Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 631 [102
Cal.Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d
"The effect
charging ... conspiratorial
conduct is to
who agree to
plan to commit the wrong
actually carry it out. [Citations.]" ·(Black v. Sullivan
as well as those
(1975) 48 Cal.App.3d
566 [122
I
Therefore a plaintiff is ..... ".""'"'
concurred
the

.. "'""''~"' from those defendants who
its unlawful purpose.
[Aug. 1979)
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(Black v. Sullivan,
CaLApp.3d at p. 566.) Furthermore, the
requiSite concurrence and knowledge "'"may be inferred from the
nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the
alleged conspirators, and other circumstances."'" (Chicago Title Ins. Co.
v. Great Wes1ern Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 316 [70 Cai.Rptr.
849, 444 P.2d 481].) Tacit consent as well as express approval will suffice
to hold a person liable as a coconspirator. (Holder v. Home Sav. & Loan
Assn. (1968) 267 Cai.App.2d 91, 108 [72 Cal.Rptr. 704].)
Directors and officers of a corporation are not rendered personally
I;able for its torts merely because of their official positions, but may
become liable if they directly ordered, authorized or participated in the
tortious conduct. (United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc.
(1970) I Cal.3d 586, 595 [83 Cal.Rptr. 418, 463 P.2d 770].) Personal
liability, if otherwise justified, may rest upon a "conspiracy" among the
officers and directors to injure third parties through the corporation.
(Golden v. Anderson (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 714, 719-720 [64 Cal.Rptr.
404]; cf. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 566, 576 [108
Cal.Rptr. 480, 510 P.2d 1032]; Wise v. Southern Pacific Co. (1963) 223
Cal.App.2d 50. 72 [35 Cai.Rptr. 652].) (8) Shareholders of a corporation are not normally liable for its torts, but personal liability may attach
to them through application of the "alter ego" doctrine (see, e.g.,
Associated Vendors Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825,
836-837 [26 Cal.Rptr. 806]), or when the shareholder specifically directed
or authorized the wrongful acts.
(7)

(9) When judged against these legal standards, the record supports
the jury verdict. First, evidence was introduced at trial to show it was
company policy to lure potential borrowers such as respondents into their
offices through misleading "bait arid switch" advertising. Secondly, on
several occasions, appellant Tushner instructed other company officials
that "late charges were a great source of income," and that "it had been a
policy of the company that if the first payment was late, aU the rest of the
payments would automatically be late."
The record further discloses a tightly knit, family-oriented business
operation under appellant Tushner's dose personal control. Tushner
owned all or a controlling interest in each of the affiliated corporations.
Each of the other individual appellants was an officer or director of one
or more of the corporations and each was active in some management
position at some time during the years when the conspiracy is alleged to
have occurred.
[Aug. 1979]
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Finally, all the headquarters offices of appellant corporations were in
the same building. The
loan papers signed by respondents .at
Stockton's Sacramento
included a deed of trust containing printed
instructions that, when recorded, the deed should be mailed to "Union
Home Mortgage Company." Soon after the loan papers were negotiated,
a letter was sent to respondents on the letterhead of "Union Home
Loans." The letter instructed respondents to mail all payments to Secured
Investment
Los Angeles. The procedure on the second
payments were mailed to Western Computer
From the above evidence, the jury
reasonably conclude that the
breaches of fiduciary duties owed to respondents were undertaken
pursuant to established company policies agreed to by each .of the
appellants.

IV
(10) Appellants contend that
statute
limitations barred respondents' claims. They reason that the three-year period allowed for
commencing actions based on fraud (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd..4) had
passed, the complaint
been filed
years after the first loan and
more than three
second loan. 2
However, the
correctly noted that, when a civil conspiracy is
properly
the statute of
does not begin to
run on any part of a
claims
the "last overt act" pursuant to
the conspiracy has
completed. (Schessler v. Keck (1954) 125
Cal.App.2d 827,
[271 P.2d 588].) Here the "last overt act" was
appellants' collection a few weeks before trial of the final payment on the
1970 loan. This was
culminating act in the conspiracy to defraud
respondents
with the first tortious act 1966. Therefore, the
to instruct
jury on the statute of
trial judge
limitations.

doctrine
appellants stress,

court repudiate the "last overt act" doctrine
125 Cal.App.2d 827. Schessler derived the
law regarding criminal conspiracies. However,
because a criminal conspiracy is itself a

2 The gravamen of
cause of action is that the appellants committed actual
and constructive
to breach their fiduciary duties toward the
respondents. Therefore.
of
Procedure section 338, subdivision 4 states the
applicable statute of limitations.
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punishable and continuing wrong
courts stay the running of the
statute of limitations until acts in furtherance of the conspiracy have
ceased. This rationale, appellants conclude, is absent the case of a civil
conspiracy, precisely because such a conspiracy is neither a punishable
offense standing alone nor a wrong capable of supporting a cause of
action by its own weight.
The differences between civil and criminal conspiracies are accurately
characterized by appellants. However, they are somewhat beside the
point. (ll) Statutes of limitations have, as their general purpose, to
provide repose and to protect persons ag::dnst the burden of having to
defend against stale daims.3 (Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency (1944)
321 U.S. 342, 348-349 [88 LEd. 788, 792-793, 64 S.Ct. 582]; Shain v.
Sresovich (1894) 104 Cal. 402, 406 [38 P. 51
So long as a person
continues to commit wrongful acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to harm
another, he can neither claim unfair prejudice at the filing of a claim
against him nor disturbance of any justifiable repose built upon the
passage of time.
In the present case, for instance, appellants stood accused of continuing
their tortious conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy up until-and even
after-the filing of the complaint. It was their own conduct that kept the
cause of action against them alive. Therefore, no considerations of justice
or equity require us to overrule the consistent line of cases that have
applied the "last overt act" doctrine to civil conspiracies. (Bedolla v.
Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 136-137 [125 Cal.Rptr. 59J;
Kenworthy v. Brown (1967) 248 CaLApp.2d 298, 301 [56 Cal.Rptr. 461];
Schessler v. Keck, supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at pp. 832-833.) 4
3 Thus. the concurring and dissenting opinion misreads this court's opinion when it
states that the majority view the statute of limitations as "intended primarily to confer
'respose' on deserving defendants." (Cone. and dis. opn., post, at p. 797.) We give equal
consideration above to protecting persons "against the butden of having to defend against
stale claims." In the present case. as the concurring and dissenting opinion itself points
out. a witness to the actual conspiracy was still available and testified at trial.
4Contrary to the claim of the concurring and dissenting opinion (post, at p .. 795),
acceptance of the "last overt act" doctrine does not mean accepting the view that the civil
conspiracy is itself a tort. Instead. it is precisely because the civil conspiracy is not a ton or
a cause of action itself that the tolling of the statute of limitations on the underlying torts
in this case becomes relevant at all.
Justice Richardson's reliance (post, at pp. 792, 793) on Bowman v. Wohlke (1913) 166 Cal.
121 [135 P. 37] is also misplaced. The court there simply held that, under then existing
statutory provisions. "causes of action for injuries to property may not be united in one
action with causes of action for injuries to the person or character." (ld, at p. 124.) The
coun also held that statutory rules governing pleading required causes of action united in
one complaint to be stated separately. (!d., at p. 127.) The plaintiff had tried to avoid the
effect of these rules by arguing that his allegations of civil conspiracy in effect created a

[Aug. 1979]
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The situation of the respondents, on the other hand, demonstrates the
equities served by the "last overt act" doctrine in cases where the fraud is
of a continuing nature. There was substantial evidence that appellants
were involved in perfecting a scheme whose purpose was to trap
respondents on a financial "treadmill" from which they could not escape.
Once trapped by the unexpectedly large balloon payment due at the end
of the first loan, the respondents found themselves forced to refinance the
loan, much as appellants planned. (Efforts to obtain financing from other
sources failed.) This permitted the repetitive collection of brokerage fees
and late charges from respondents, depletir.g their resources and moving
foreclosure ever closer.

(12) When, as here, the underlying fraud is a continuing wrong, a
convincing rationale exists for delaying the running of the statute of
limitations. Just as the statute of limitations does not run against an action
~ased on fraud so long as the fraud remains concealed, so ought the
statute to be tolled even after the fraud is discovered, for so long as the sheer
economic duress or undue influence embedded in the fraud continues to hold
the victim in place. 5

None of the cases relied on by appellants has disapproved the holding
in Schessler. In Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 756 [343 P.2d 118],
plaintiff alleged a conspiracy to obstruct the orderly prosecution of her
malpractice action. However, the face of the complaint made apparent
.that the last fraudulent act pursuant to the conspiracy occurred more than
three years prior to the filing of the pleading. Under these circumstances,
the court held that defendants' motion for nonsuit was properly granted.
Such a holding, of course, is entirely consistent with Schessler. That case
still requires a plaintiff to allege that at least some act pursuant to the
conspiracy was still being performed (or was only discovered) within the
applicable statute of limitations time period.
single cause of action. uniting all the wrongs done in furtherance of the conspiracy. (Id.•
at p. 124.) This was the argument the court rejected in Bowman v. Wohlke. Nothing in
today's opinion changes that result. In fact. issues concerning joinder or separate
statement of causes of action are not germane to this case. Moreover. unlike the plaintiff
in Bown:wn v. Wohlke, plaintiff here has never argued that civil conspiracy itself is a cause
of action.
"This court need not decide today the question of whether this principle would apply.
ven if the continuing fraud were pursued by one person acting alone. (For a discussion
f the effect that proof of undue influence or duress has on the running of the statute of
mitations in other kinds of cases. see Developments in the Lav:--Starutes of Limitations
950) 63 Harv.L.Rev. 1177. 1219.}
[Aug. 1979]
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That Schess/er
Agnew v. Parks are entirely consistent was made
clear in Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d at pages 136-137,
where the court wrote: "[W]hile the cases support the proposition that a
cause of action based on civil conspiracy accrues on the date of the
commission of the last overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy (Schessler
v. Keck (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 827, 832-833 ... ), it is imperative for the
plaintiff to allege when the last overt act took place (Agnew v. Parks,
supra)." Since over four years had lapsed between the "last overt act" of
the conspiracy and the filing of the complaint, the Bedolla court held that
the statute of limitations had run on the cause of action. (See also
Kenworthy v. Brown, supra, 248 Cal.App.2d at pp. 301-303; Filice v.
Boccardo (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 843, 846 [26 Cal. Rptr. 789]; Teitelbaum
v. Borders (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 634, 637-638 [23 Cal.Rptr. 868].)
Finally. it is noteworthy that many of the arguments now urged against
the "last overt act" doctrine were presented to the Court of Appeal in
Rodriguez v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 889 (61
Cal.Rptr. 579]. In that case plaintiff charged defendants with conspiring
to defame him by publishing defamatory remarks on or about October 9,
1962, then again on October 31, 1963. Plaintiff alleged that he was
dismissed from his employment on October 31, 1963, due to these
defamations. He filed suit on October 13, 1964. The applicable statute of
limitations was one year.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to the entire complaint but the
Court of Appeal reversed. relying on the fact that the complaint had been
filed within one year of the "last overt act" pursuant to the alleged
conspiracy. (!d., at pp. 893-894.) Thus, even while expressing some doubt
about the wisdom of the Schessler case in dicta, the Rodriguez court went
on to use the "last overt act" doctrine to judge the sufficiency of the
plcadmg before it.
The Rodrigue:: court specifically declined to rule on whether the statute
of limitations barred recovering damages flowing from the earlier
publication. finding it impossible to tell from the complaint whether the
plaintiff meant to claim separate damages for each of the two publications. Because the Court of Appeal thus avoided this issue, the Rodriguez
case gives little support to appellant's argument that the statute of
limitations has run at least on the first of the two loans obtained by the
respondents. This court is satisfied that Schessler v. Keck, supra, 125
Cai.App 2d 827 correctly states the law ofthis state.
[Aug. 19791
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v
Appellants' final
concern the jury's decision to award
punitive damages. 6 Appellants first argue that the evidence was not
sufficient to justify awarding punitive damages. Even if there was
justification for punitive damages, appellants urge this court to find that
the amount awarded was excessive as a matter of law.
(13) Appellants' first argument is totally without merit. There was
substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that the appellants were guilty of fraud when they conspired to breach their fiduciary
duty toward the respondents. Therefore, this was an entirely appropriate
case in which to award punitive damages. Fraudulent misrepresentations
by real estate brokers
supported punitive damages in the past. (See,
e.g., Ward v. Taggart (1
5 i CaL2d 736,
[336 P.2d 534].)
Nor can
court
that
amount
damages
was excessive as a matter
a recent case makes dear, the
purpose of punitive damages is to penaltze wrongdoers in a way that will
deter them and others from repeating the wrongful conduct in the future.
(Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1978) 21 Cal.3d 910, 928, fn. 13 [148
Cal.Rptr. 389, 582
980].) "How much" in punitive damages is
enough to
case is not susceptible
of mathematical
(1950) 35 Cal.2d 161, 164
[217 P.2d I
(14)

the
case,
concealment from borrowers
the company
policy regarding "late charges" comprised the core of appellants'
wrongful conduct. At trial respondents introduced direct evidence
showing that the "late charge" policy was the income-generating motor
for Secured and Western, bringing in millions of dollars during the years
respondents' loans were
serviced by one of the two companies. 7
The structure of the corporations was such that the jury could reasonably
infer that the individual appellants (shareholders, officers or directors of
6 Civil

Code section 3294

in pertinent part: '1WJhere the defendant has been

guilty of oppression. fraud, or malice, express or implied. the plaintiff, in addition to the
actual damages. may recover
the defendant."
7The parties ""~'"a"'""
$151,841.15
$668.673.78 (
(1971
Western to be as follows: $451
$517,570.28

for the sake of example and by· way of punishing
income of Secured to be as follows:
$664,409.36 (1968 ); $558,552.85 (1969):
stipulated the "late charge" income of
); $565,173.87 (1972): $459,984.02 (1973);
[Aug. 1979)
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Secured or Western or one of
affiliates) had personally profited from
the wrongful conduct. Therefore, an award of $200,000, apportioned
among eight corporate and individual appellants, was not excessive.
Indeed, the trial judge, in denying appellants' motion
new trial,
thought the award showed remarkable restraint. This court agrees. The
uncontested evidence shows that the award was much less than the
income directly generated by appellants' wrongful conduct.
The judgment is affirmed.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Manuel, J., and Newman, J., concurred.

RICHARDSON,
concur in the reasoning
parts II and III of the
majority opinion; I also agree that punitive damages, if properly awarded
on all counts of the complaint, were not excessive. I I:espectfully dissent,
however, from the judgment of affirmance, because I believe the statute
of limitations barred much of respondents' complaint. In my view, the
"last overt act" doctrine should not be applied in civil cases.
As the majority concedes, the maxim that the statute of limitations on a
"conspiracy" is tolled until commission of the "last overt act" originated
in criminaL law, where it remains the prevailing rule. (Grunewald v.
United States (1957) 353 U.S. 391, 396-397 [1 L.Ed.2d 931, 938-939, 77
S.Ct. 963, 62 A.L.R.2d 1344]; People v. Zamora(l976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 548
[134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75]; People v. Crosby (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713,
728 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839]; see generally, Annot. 62 A.LR.2d
1369, 1371-1375.) Criminal conspiracy is a punishable offense separate
from the substantive crime to the commission of which the conspirators
have agreed. (Pen. Code, § 182.) At common law, criminal sanctions
could be imposed even where the conspirators had taken no action to
accomplish the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy. (See Hyde v. United
States (1912) 225 U.S. 347, 359 [56 LEd. 1114, 1123, 32 S.Ct. 793].)
Modern statutes require some "overt act" in furtherance of the conspiracy as an element of the crime (e.g., Pen. Code, § 184); the most
frequently stated reason for this rule ts that it permits a conspirator to
repent and withdraw from the scheme before any decisive action is taken.
(E.g., People v. Olson (1965) 232 Cai.App.2d 480, 490 [42 CaLRptr. 760].)
However, the substantive crime need not have been completed, nor must
the "overt act" itself be criminal, because it is the agreement itself which
forms the basis of prosecution. (People v. Saugstad (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d
536. 540 [21 Cal.Rptr. 740]; People v. Reed (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 395,
[Aug. 1979J
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407 [ 10 Cai.Rptr. 536]: People v. Klinkenberg (1949) 90 Cai.App.2d 608,
635-636 [204 P.2d 47, 6l3J; People v. Corica (1942) 55 Cai.App.2d 130, 134
[130 P.2d 164J.)
As we explained in Zamora, the "last overt act" rule in criminal
conspiracy thus arises from an analytical focus on the continuation of the
unla~ful agreement as a criminal offense in and of itself (18 Cal.3d at
pp. 548-549, fn. 7.) Where the purposes of the conspiracy can be
consummated, if at all, only by successive acts over a period of time, the
crime of conspiracy is deemed a "continuing" one; the successive "overt
acts" in furtherance of the unlawful agreement "mark the duration, as
well as the scope" of the crime. (Fiswick v. Uni!ed States ( 1946) 329 U.S.
21 J, 216 [91 L.Ed. 196,200,67 S.Ct. 224]; see Yates v. United Sraies (1957)
354 U.S. 298,334 [I L.Ed.2d 1356, 1384,77 S.Ct. 1064].)
Civil conspiracy, on the other hand, has experienced an entirely
different and separate development. (de Vries v. Brumback (1960) 53
Cal.2d 643, 649-650 [2 Cal.Rptr. 764, 349 P.2d 532].) The gist of an action
charging civil conspiracy is not the agreement itself, but the damage
suffered as the result of a tort or torts committed in furtherance of the
joint design. No conspiracy, however atrocious, gives rise to any civil
cause of action unless an underlying civil wrong, resulting in damage, is
alleged and proven. (Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d
616, 631 {102 Cal.Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d 1063]; Chicago Title Ins. Co. v.
Great Western Financial Corp. ( 1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 316 [70 Cal.Rptr.
849, 444 P.2d 481]; Orlo.ffv. Metropolitan Trusl Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 484,
488 [110 P.2d 396].) Allegations of conspiracy add nothing whatever that
i's substantive to a civil complaint; their only purpose is to permit joinder
as defendants of all parties who agreed to the tort, regardless of whether
they directly participated in its commission. (Mox incorporated v. Woods
(1927) 202 Cal. 675, 677-678 [262 P. 302]; Wise v. Southern Pacific Co.
(1963) 223 CaLApp.2d 50, 64 [35 Cal.Rptr. 652J.) The applicable statute
of limitations for a civil conspiracy is that for the underlying tort.
(Kenworthy v. Brown (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 298, 301 [56 Cal.Rptr. 461];
Agnew v. Parks (1959) I72 Cal.App.2d 756, 765 [343 .P.2d 118].)
These long established principles were applied by us in Bowman v.
Wohlke (19!3) 166 Cal. 121 [ 135 P. 37], to prevent the improper inclusion
of separate torts in a single complaint under a "conspiracy" theory.
There, plaintiffs joined claims for injury to person, property, and
reputation, then generally not permitted under former Code of Civil
!Aug. 1979)
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Procedure section 427.
see Code Civ.
427.10.) When
defendants
verdict and denial of their new
motion on
ffs asserted that such
claims could
the various torts alleged had been committed pursuant
to a
them.
We rejected that view.
has been said," we
''that 'the
allegation and proofs of a conspiracy in an action of
character is [sic]
only important to connect a defendant with a transaction and to charge
him with the ... cts and declarations of his co-conspirators, where otherwise
he could not have been implicated.' (Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N.Y. 454,
... See, also, 8
Doremus v. Hennessey, 62
391.) The
effect of this
doctrine in so far as the case
us IS
concerned is clear. The complaint alleged various causes of action for
different torts. all committed, it is true. in
of a single
conspiracy. but each, nevertheless, giving rise to a
cause of
action for the injury caused
the particular wrongful act. Whether or
not the various causes of action could properly be united depended on
our statutes relating to the joinder of causes of action in one complaint."
(P. 126.)

Bowman thus represents this court's dear view, not heretofore repudiated, that allegations of civil "conspiracy" do not change the legal
nature and effect
causes
action for the separate underlying torts.
Nonetheless, the majority, in a footnote, dismisses Bowman as inapposite.
Rather, it relies upon a Court of Appeal decision,
v. Keck
(1954) 125
827
I P.2d 588]. There,
sued three
defendants for
remarks allegedly made by them over a period
of several years. She asserted that the remarks were part of a conspiracy
to injure her in her
one of the
had occurred
withm the one-year
normally applicable to defamation
actions. (Code Civ.
subd. 3.) The two defendants to whom
the earlier statements were attributed successfully demurred on grounds
of the statute. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of dismissaL
Citing People v. Hess (1951) 104 Cal.App.2d 642 [234 P.2d 65], a
criminal case, as its sole primary authority, the Schessler court concluded
that the wnspiracy allegations permitted suit against aU defendants on an
publications, since the statute did not begin to run on any of the torts
until there was "a cessation of the wrongful acts committed in furtherance
of the conspiracy." (l25 Cal.App.2d at p. 832.) This doctrine has
[Ail)!. 19791
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concededly been acknowledged in a number of subsequent California
appellate decisions. (E.g., Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d
118, 136 [125 Cal.Rptr. 59] [finding "last overt act" occurred outside
limitation period]; Kenworthy v. Brown, supra, 248 Cal.App.2d 298, 302
[same]; see Filice v. Boccardo (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 843, 846 [26
Cai.Rptr. 789].)
Recognizing the confusion and potential abuse inherent in the
Schess!er rule, however, other districts of the Court of Appeal have
resisted its full implications. In Agnew v. Parks, supra, 172 Cal.App.2d
756, for example, it was held that, despite allegations of "conspir~cy," the
statute of limitations runs separately on each "separate, distinct and
complete" act which violates the rights of another. Schessler was not
mentioned. (P. 765.)
·As the majority indicates, Agnew found plaintiff's claim barred
because her complaint revealed that the last "fraudulent" act therein
alleged had occurred more than three y'ears before suit was commenced.
(P. 766.) Read in context, however, this holding only reaffirms the
unassailable principle that an action for fraud, even if joined with
conspiracy claims, must be filed within three years after the act
constituting "fraud" takes place. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 4.)
Agnew does not support a rule that commencement of the statute of
limitations for all tortious acts in a conspiracy is blindly deferred until
commission of the last "overt" act in the conspiracy.
More recently, in Rodriguez v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1967)
252 Cal.App.2d 889 [61 Cal.Rptr. 579], another conspiracy case involving
multiple slander, the court applied the "last overt act" rule at the
pleading stage, but only because it concluded that the complaint
essentially sought damages only for the most recent, still timely publication. Significantly, and voicing its doubts, the Rodriguez court observed:
"We have not been cited any case, nor has our research produced one, in
which one overt act committed within the statutory period and one prior
thereto executed in pursuance of a conspiracy, have been considered in
relation to the statute of limitations, except Schessler v. Keck, supra, and
in that case the issue is not clear-cut .... [~] If ... plaintiff were to ...
seek recovery [for damages] ... resulting from separate and completed
acts of slander committed before the statutory period, it is doubtful that
the action as to such acts and damages could escape the bar of the statute
of !imitations." (Pp. 893-894.)
[Aug. 1979)
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The majority suggests that appellants' acts may be linked by the
conspiracy into a "continuing wrong," thereby tolling the statute of
limitations until appellants' tortious conduct finally ceased. For several
reasons, I disagree.

First, the majority's proposal ignores the well settled principle,
discussed above, that the focus of a civil conspiracy action is indeed upon
the separate torts, not the "continuing" nature of th~ scheme itself.
Despite the majority's protestations to the contrary, acceptance of any
"last oven act" rule amounts to a concession that the continuing unlawful
scheme is in itself a tort. This is clearly not the law (Bowman v. Wohlke,
supra, 166 CaL 121, 126), and the majority errs in characterizing the fraud
as "a continuing wrong" (ante, pp. 787-788). Rather, there were several,
separate, successive tortious acts, each one independently actionable.

Second, contrary to the majority's suggestion, a "continuing wrong"
doctrine is not justified by the equitable considerations raised in its
defense. Rules in this area seek to balance "the practical purposes that a
statute of limitations serves in our legal system"-i.e., avoidance of stale
and open-ended claims-against "the practical needs of prospective
plaintiffs"-i.e., preservation of an effective remedy for wrongful conduct. (Davies v. Krasna (1975) 14 Cal.3d 502, 512 [121 Cal.Rptr. 705, 535
P.2d 1161, 79 A.L.R.3d 807].) Accordingly, the law has developed
numerous general safeguards, applicable to "conspiratorial" and "nonconspiratorial" torts alike, to assure that the strong public policies
represented by the statute of limitations do not foreclose a plaintiff's
remedy for wrongs committed against him. For example, the statute of
limitations on any claim is deferred until a cause of action has "accrued."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 312.) This occurs, at the earliest, when some "actual
and appreciable damage" has resulted from a defendant's wrongful act.
(Davies v. Krasna, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 513-514; Buddv. Nixen (1971) 6
Cal.3d 195, 200 [98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433].) Moreover, in
appropriate cases, "accrual" may be further delayed until actual or
constructive discovery of the claim (e.g., Code Civ. Proc., §§ 338, subd. 4
[fraud], 340.5 [medical malpractice]; Nee! v. Magana, Olney, Levy,
Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 194 [98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d
421] [legal malpractice]; Coots v. Southern Pacific Co. (1958) 49 Cal.2d
805, 810 [322 P.2d 460J progressive industrial condition leading to
disability; statute commences when disability occurs]; Avner v. Longridge
Eswtes (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 607,616 [77 Cal.Rptr. 633] latent defects in
!Aug 1'1191
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subdivision lot]: Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 330,
348 [68 Cal.Rptr. 617] [latent product defect].)
Each of these doctrines deals directly with the "practical problems of
prospective plaintiffs" in asserting an effective remedy for damage
wrongfully caused by another. They ensure that the limitations period
will not run before an injured party has had a realistic opportunity to sue.
In contrast, the "last overt act" doctrine operates mechanically, without
reference to plaintiff's diligence, affording plaintiff the bonanza of a
tolled statute for torts upon which he long since could have commenced
suit
Indeed, the majority so applies the rule here. Apparently' conceding
respondents' Apri/1970 discovery of appellants' previous tortious conduct,
the majority would nonetheless toll the statute in spite of full discovery so
long as unsophisticated plaintiffs continue to suffer the effects of the
. fraud. (Ante, pp. 787-788.) For obvious reasons, this novel theory is clearly
contrary to prior California law, as the majority elsewhere (ante, pp. 788,
789) acknowledges (Davies v. Krasno., supra, 14 CaL3d 502, 514; Teitelbaum v. Borders (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 634, 637-638 [23 Cal.Rptr. 868]),
and notions of fundamental fairness do not compel its adoption.
Discovery of a cause of action necessarily implies the ability to act in
vindication of one's legal rights. (See, e.g., Sanche:: v. South Hoover
Ho!.pital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 101-103! 132 Cai.Rptr. 657. 553 P.2d I 129].)
The most fundamental difficulty with the "last overt act" rule, of
course, is its fortuitous and random inequity. Where a single defendant is
involved, plaintiff may clearly not avoid the statute of limitations on an
earlier tort by waiting to commence suit until further tortious acts of the
defendant have produced even greater damage. (Davies v. Krasna, supra,
14 Cal.3d at pp. 512-515.) There appears absolutely no reason why a
different rule should apply simply because two or more persons "conspired" to commit the identical wrongs. On policy grounds plaintiffs
should be encouraged to nip "conspiracies" in the bud. The "last overt
act" rule applied to civil wrongs, on the other hand, encourages injured
parties to sit by until the conspiratorial scheme has operated with full
force and has run its extended ultimate course. The statute of limitations
on each of the precedent causes of action which have fully accrued is
meanwhile suspended in midair, as it were. Such a rule makes no sense,
and defeats the purposes of the statute of limitations while serving no
legitimate needs of injured plaintiffs.
(Aug. 1979]
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Contrary to the majority's suggestion the statute of limitations is not
intended primarily to confer "repose" on deserving defendants. Its most
important function. one the majority declines to analyze, is to avoid the
problems of proof inherent in actions based o·n incidents long past.
(Dal'ies v. Krasna, supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 512; Elkins v. Derby (1974) 12
Cal.3d 410.417 [115 Cal.Rptr. 641,525 P.2d 81.71 A.L.R.3d 839].) By the
time this action was filed in July 1973, acts occurring seven years before
may well have receded in the memories of available witnesses. In fact,
only one witness to the actual conspiracy was presented at triaL The
instant case thus illustrates. rather than refutes, the need for certitude in
the application of a statute of limitations.
It has been said that the numerous decisions of other jurisdictions on
this issue present "a melange of inconsistent, irreconcilable, even
contradictory statements of general 'rules' relating to the subject."
(Annnt 62 A.L.R.2d 1369. 1385.) My examination of these authorities
fails to per~uade me of the: efficacy of a "last overt act" rule. The better
reasoned view, I think, is that which is expressed in Universal Film
Exchange~ v. Swanson (D.Minn. 1958) 165 F.Supp. 95. There, the court
succinctly repudiated the notion that separate torts may be "welded" into
a single claim under the "hammer" of conspiracy allegations. (P. 98.)
l therefore reject the majority's conclusion that the statute of limitations for separate tortious acts committed pursuant to a civil "conspiracy"
is tolled until the "last overt act" in the conspiracy. Rather, the limitations
period should be deemed to commence for each underlying tort when, a
known injury to plaintiff occurring, a cause of action has "accrued"
thereon according to the rules normally applicable, and in no event later
than plaintiffs' discovery of grounds for a cause of action. I would,
accordingly. cling 10 our earlier Bowman rationale and disapprove
Schessler v. Keck, surra. to the extent that it conflicts with these views.
Since the evidence before us would justify a finding that causes of
action based on the 1966 loan "accrued" and were discovered no later
than April 1970, more than three years prior to suit, appellants were
entitled to instructions on the statute of limitations as to those claims. On
the other hand, respondents' claims that late charges were improperly
extracted on the 1970 loan appear to have been asserted in timely fashion.
Discovery and damage with respect to these fraudulent acts could not
have ari~en until March or April 1973. when plaintiffs were again faced
li\11~
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with an unexpectedly high balloon payment. Suit was filed within three to
four months thereafter. Accordingly, as a matter of law, this latter claim is
not barred.
I would reverse the judgment.
Clark, J .. concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied September 12, 1979.
Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

(Aug. 1979]
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Pi:RIODS OF LIMITATION PRESCRmED.

the commencement of actions
property, are as follows:

PROCEDURE

OODE

EXHIBIT C

llalllllty, neeptlon; tre•pan or l11jury te realty;
or chattel!>; fruil or mistake; INnd
allildiUoul time, maximum limit; alan·
Wlthln three fesl.nl:
1. AD action upon a Uli.I»Uty created by statute, other tban a penalty or for-

feiture.
2. AD' aetloo for

~ upon or l.njuey to fl:lSl property .
.8. AD action for ~. detaining, or l.njunng any goods, or cllattels, includln&'
~for the llqleclfie reeovery of peri!IOnal property.
4. An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. '!'be caWJe of action
Ia web CIUle oot to be deemed to have acerued until the dii!ICOvery, by the aggrieved
party, of tbe facts coru~Ututlng the fraud or mistake.

IS. AD action upon a bond of a public official except uy eaw.e of action bued on
fraud or embezzlement is not to be deemed to have acerued until the discovery, b::V
the agrleved party or bls agent, of tbe facts coru~tltutlng said earu~e of action
upon tbe bond.
8. AD lllctlon qaiut a ootlllry public on his bond or ill bis official capacity e:r·
cept that uy cause of sctlou based 011 malfe~~J~&nce or mlafeaaance is not deemed
to have accrued until
by the aggrieved part)' or bls aaent. of the facts
conltitutiDg said cau~~e of
provided, tbat any action baaed on malfeasance
or misfeua:oce shall be commenced witbln one year from dii!ICOvery, b::v the a&·
crieved party or bls agent, of the facts COil!!titUtlllg said eause of action or witbln
1lmle ;rears from the performuce of tbe :ootlllrial act giving rise to said action,
whichever is later; ud provided further, that uy action agaiut a notary public
on hia bond or 1n bla official eapactty must be commenced wltbln Bl:r years.
7. AD action for slander of title to real property.
8. AD action commenced under Section 11536 of the BnsiDeu ud Profeuloru~
Code. The cause of action in auch ease shall not be deemed to have accrued until
the discovery by tbe agrleved party, the Attorney General, the district attorney,
the county couWJel, tbe clty prosecutor, or tbe clty attorney of the facts constltutiDg
pounds for commencing such an action.
(Amended by 8tats.1957, e. 649, p. 1849, § 1; 8tats.1972, c. 823, p. 1470, 1 2.)
Legal malpractice all.lle8. Cari<NI SoUa
(11172) 7 U.S.F.L.Rev. 115.
Prh·ate environmental legal action. Ter·
ry A. Trumbull (197:1) 7 s.F:L.R. 21.
Remedies !or falae advertlaltng: leciala·
tive review. (1978) 4 Pacific L.J. 135.
Statute of llmltationa for lawyers. 1\onl!.ld E. :Mallen (1977) 52 S.Bar J. %2.
Statute of Umltatlona In Rule lOb-6 actions. (1117~) 22 U.C.L.A.Law Rev ...7.
Wife'a written consent to lrlfUt ot community property, Loulll M. Brown . (1162)
ll'7 S.Ba.r J. 71.

lilhap:plem.-t&rF b&u to
1\!lac:k Noilllry c:lalme &7
4t.5

w.-

.i

llillandamue Ai
Monthly lll'lllltlllllmenta f8

ll'enalon claims II
Petroleum product overcna,... 42.1

Ulillerllllo lrnUcata UIIIIPII or adilltloa11 lly amealll•e•t
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EXHIBIT D
LAW OFFICES OF

IRVINE P. DUNGAN
1128 K STREET • SUITE 201
UNITED CALIFORNIA BANK BUILDING

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814
444-2!100

october 21, 1980

MEMORANDUM TO ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
REGARDING FORMER AB 2382 AMENDMENTS
(To Change Statute of Limitations in Civil
cases Where There is Continuing Wrongdoing)

The Union Home Loan Amendments contain two sections
that ar~ designed to overturn and change well established law
in the State. Since 1954, 26 years ago, at least six different
Appellate Courts, and the Supreme Court in Wyatt v. Union
Home Loans (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, have carefully considered
the concept involved and upheld it despite all the arguements
raised by various interests probably including the same arguments that are being raised before the legislature at this
time.
These amendments although appearing to be innocuous, actually are very dangerous for the people of this State.
The present rule established by Schessler v. Keck (1954), 125
Cal.App.2d 827, states that where a cont1nu1ng course of
wrongdoing whether it be fraud, negligence, intentional
interference with contractural relationship, medical malpractice,
legal malpractice, or any other kind of wrongdoing, which
extends over a period of years, longer than the statute of
limitations for any single wrongful act, where there is a
scheme by two or more persons to join forces in the form of
a civil conspiracy, then the statute of limitations on any
wrongful act pursuant to this scheme or plan does not begin
to run until the last act of the conspiracy. This of course
makes great sense and six Appellate Courts (18 judges and
their law clerks) as well as the Supreme Court have carefully
considered this concept and have approved it. The Third
District Court of Appeal did so in the ~att case in an
opinion written by former State Senator Edward Regan.
1. These amendments seek to throw all this out
and establish a very dangerous rule because this is how it
would normally work. Despite the fact for example in a
serious case of fraud involving home loans that are refinanced
every few years, the borrower must file suit even though
there is a threatening lien upon his home after he discovers
he was victimized and he must file suit within three years of
the discovery of the facts even though he is still subject
to the continuing fraud and is very vulnerable. People in
this state are reluctant to incur unknown risks in going to
-64-
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Court, particularly where they are dealing with a big financial
organization. This applies as well to attorneys and many, many
suits that should be brought aren't because of the public's
worry about legal
and entanglements, and they just pay
up and suffer.
2. Another bad aspect of these amendments are
that after the first suit is filed, additional lawsuits would
have to be filed to cover each of the subsequent tortious
wrongs resulting in Court time waste, multiplicity of suits
and further expense to all parties.
3. As soon as anyone filed suit against a lender
particularly, they would report the borrowers to the various
credit agencies resulting most likely in credit being cut-off
often resulting in the borrower being turned down for a new
loan to pay off the fraudulent one
borrower could claim
they were taken advantage of but credit agencies tend to
take the position that they would put an explanation in the
file, but the explanation would not be complete until after
the suit went to trial and so serious credit damage could
easily occur.
The argument
the bill involves something that
constitutes a logical
The present law has been
the law of
s state
1954, the same arguments have
been used
many
Court briefs and rejected, and
we are all aware that an extreme argument can be made when
in fact it never occurs. The proposed amendments to the
law would cause individuals in this state to suffer at the
hands of commercial interests that would take advantage of
the law by deliberately committing wrongs knowing that they
could get away with most
them after three years had gone
by in fraud cases and such conduct of course should not be
permitted at any time.
Sincerely yours,

Irvine P. Dungan
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APPENDIX A

TELEPHONE: (916) 445·5126

STATEHENT OF KATE DOYLE
BEFORE THE ASSEUBLY C011!-1ITTEE ON JUDICIARY
ON THE Il.fi'ORTANCE OR 1-iA.INTAINING THE
CURRENT RULE FOR THE RUNNING OF THE
STATUTE OF LIUITATIONS IN ACTIONS IN
WHICH CIVIL CONSPIRACY HAS BEEN
ALLEGED AND PROVED

OCTOBER 23, 1980

I~.

is Kate Doyle.

Chairman and members of the Committee, my name
I am an attorney in the Legal Serivces Unit of

the Division of Consumer Services, California Department of
Consumer Affairs, and am testifying for our Department.
Initially, it should be noted that in Wyatt v. Union
Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 157 Cal.Rptr. 392, the California
Supreme Court did not establish the rule that in those cases
where civil conspiracy has been alleged, the statute of limitations
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for the underlying tort does not begin to run until the last
overt act pursuant to the conspiracy has been completed.

This

rule has been applied in civil conspiracy cases by the appellate
courts of our state for over 20 years.
From a policy perspective, the full import of a scheme
that may be injurious to the consumer may not be recognized
by the consumer until such time as the last overt act necessary
to complete the scheme has taken place.

In the Wyatt case

the fraud included inducing consumers to make contracts on the
basis of misrepresentations in advertising, and then bringing
pressure to bear to keep the consumer indebted for long periods
of time with

ever-increasing balances upon which more and more

interest could be charged.

This was accomplished through the

device of refinancing when the consumer could not meet the
payments he had anticipated \'Vould be collected.

Indeed in

Wyatt until the consumers were threatened with foreclosure
proceedings against their home, the full import and effect
of the scheme was not recognized.
that they took legal action.

It was only at this point

This is not an unusual pattern.

As in Wyatt, many consumers will refinance an agreement
even when perhaps they should realize that misrepresentations
have been made.

They usually do not know the law or see

themselves as having any meaningful alternatives to refinancing.
Until the consumer realizes that the "friendly financier" is
indeed going to foreclose,the consumer is often not on notice
or sufficiently alarmed to seek professional legal advice.
Prior to that point, the consumer will have been presented with
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many confusing and difficult documents to sign with an
accompanying soothing, encouraging and often untruthful explanation
of what the forms mean.
As long as the consumer listens to what is said and
does not or cannot read and understand the documents he or she
is signing, and as long as threat of loss to the consumer is

not apparent to him or her, the consumer can very easily be
led for some time even in the face of information which could
be argued as having put him or her "on notice" of a fraud.
Consumers are all too frequently intimidated by business persons
with whom they are dealing, and many persons feel obliged
to pay their debts without complaint, even when they have good
reason to believe they have not been dealt with fairly, as
was certainly the case in Wyatt.
The fact pattern in the Nyatt case is in some respects
a prototype for business practices which are not as uncomnon as
we would all like to believe.

The Department of Consuoer

Affairs recently litigated a case regarding a scheme in
which a finance company encouraged consumers who were obligees
of retail installment sales contracts regulated by the Unruh Act
to "flip" or change the agreements into personal loans.

These

new financing agreements changed the statutory regulation of
the contracts such that a statute with fewer consumer protective
provisions and a higher interest rate provision would apply
to the agreements.

Very few consumers would be likely to

discover that this had taken place.
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new contracts were regulated by different statutes from those
regulating retail installment sales contracts, the ramifications
of those differences might not become apparent to them until
such time as the creditor attempted to repossess security
triggering the consumer to see an attorney.
Recent press coverage of home equity schemes and
lien contract schemes in Los Angeles further highlight the
unfortunate fact that not all business persons deal fairly with
consumers.

Such schemes also highlight the ease with which

the consuming public can be defrauded and the slowness with
which many such persons seek the assistance of an attorney even
when aware that something may not be quite fair about the
contract upon which they are now indebted.
It should also be kept in mind that access to legal
services for low income persons is in short supply, and that for
the lower middle to middle income person such access often requires
a substantial outlay of funds.

Consumers will not seek legal

help until some severe threat is made.
For all of these policy reasons, permitting the
statute of limitations to run from the date of the last
overt act pursuant to the conspiracy, a time which realistically
is more likely to coincide with the event which brings home to the
consumer his or her potential injury resulting from the frauq
is clearly the better rule.

The purpose of statutes of

limitations is to prevent the pursuit of stale claims.

Until

the last overt act necessary to complete a conspiracy to defraud
is taken, the claim cannot be stale.
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For these reasons the Department

Consumer Affairs

s that the California Supreme Court correctly applied
the law in ruling that the statute of limitations runs

fro~

the date of the last overt act necessary to complete the
conspiracy when civil conspiracy has been alleged, particularly
in consumer fraud cases, and that the long standing and prevailing
rule on this subject should not be changed.
Thank you for your attention.
Respectfully Submitted,
KATE DOYLE
Staff Counsel

RICHARD A. ELBRECHT, Supervising Attorney
A. PAUL GRIEBEL, Staff Counsel
LAURA vl. KAPLAN, Staff Counsel
ROGER DICKINSON, Staff Counsel
KATE DOYLE, Staff Counsel
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